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Annex B — Tamga Rulebook ​

Document FW-RB-0001 · Version 1.0.0 · Status Active · Updated 2026-10-19 · Licence CC BY 4.0 Official English translation of the Turkish source text; in case of conflict the Turkish text prevails.

Binding, numbered rules that every role joining the Tamga network must follow: operator and list operator, registrar, issuer, authentic source, wallet provider, verifier and holder. Every rule is derived from an invariant or a decision; this annex creates no new rules, it gathers them by role and states them in "MUST" language. It is the counterpart of EUDI ARF Annex 2 (High-Level Requirements).

Rulebook structure ​

The Tamga RulebookA set of binding rules. The Tamga Rulebook holds the rules for all participants; each credential type has its own rulebook that branches from it. holds the rules common to every participant and every credentialA digital document signed by an issuer and held in the person's wallet; the person shows only the fields that are asked for. type in the network. As in the EUDI ARF (Architecture and Reference Framework)The document set that describes roles, architecture, trust model and rules. Tamga ARF follows the structure of the EU ARF., each credential type has its own rulebook that branches from this one:

RulebookCredential typeDocument
Education Rulebookstudent certificate, diplomaFW-RB-0002
Identity RulebookTamga identity credentialFW-RB-0003
Event Ticket Rulebookevent ticketFW-RB-0004
Contact Rulebookverified email address, verified phone numberFW-RB-0005

A credential type rulebook inherits every rule in this book and adds only the rules specific to its type: who issues, with which identity proofingChecking that a person really is who they claim to be before a credential is issued, for example with an ID card and a liveness check., with which attributes, for how long it is valid and how it is revoked. Credential type rulebooks follow the section structure of the EU Attestation Rulebook template (§11). A new credential domain (for example health) is added as a new rulebook once the seven-condition checklist (SG1–SG7) is complete (RB-SCH-05).

Two policy documents bring the rules together by topic: the Revocation Policy (FW-POL-0001) describes under which conditions credentials are revoked, the Wallet Attestation Policy (FW-POL-0002) how wallet providers issue and revoke the WIA and KA.

What each role does and which rules bind it is on FW-ROLE-0001; the steps of joining are on FW-ONB-0001.

0. Reading guide ​

  • Rule format: RB-<ROLE>-<NN> · rule text. The decisions and specifications the rules rest on are in Annex E.
  • Keywords have their RFC 2119 meaning: MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD (recommended; deviations are justified), MAY.
  • Stage note: today the network is in the list stage: trust rests on signed lists and the anchor log. Rules marked "ledger stage" take effect when the shared ledger is set up; at that stage "list and anchor log" reads as "shared ledger". The rule text does not change.
  • The rules add no new codes to the invariants document; they are a role-based view of its codes. To change a rule, change its source document.

Roles: GEN (everyone) · OP (operator, list operator — TLSO (Trusted List Scheme Operator)The organisation that compiles, signs and publishes a national trust list. Today Tamga does this for Türkiye, provisionally on behalf of the state.) · REG (registrar) · AP (issuerThe institution that signs and issues credentials: a university, a professional body, a public institution or a company.) · AS (authentic sourceThe system that actually owns the data in a credential, for example a university's student information system.) · WP (wallet providerThe organisation that offers a wallet, registers its wallet units and signs wallet and key attestations. Each wallet runs its own provider; the network does not run one, it lists them in the trusted list.) · RP (verifierThe party that checks a presented credential: signature, issuer in the trust list, status and policy. Also called relying party., relying party) · H (holderThe person who keeps a credential in their wallet and decides whom to show it to.) · SCH (types and schemas).


1. RB-GEN — All participants ​

#Rule
RB-GEN-01A participant MUST NOT write personal data, credential content or credential digests to shared registers (trusted list, anchor log, shared ledger), logs or API responses.
RB-GEN-02A participant MUST read trust data according to the verification rules of the specification: no list entry is used without checking the signature, the version chain and freshness. Using the network's open-source packages (@tamga-network/trust) is SHOULD; a participant writing its own implementation passes the conformance tests.
RB-GEN-03If the trust source is stale (next_update passed) or unreachable, the result MUST be INDETERMINATE/UNKNOWN; never ACCEPTED, never REJECTED.
RB-GEN-04On an unknown list_format_version or (in the ledger stage) an unknown contract version, the component MUST stop and raise an alarm; accepting it is forbidden.
RB-GEN-05Tamga infrastructure components MUST NOT log IP addresses (raw, hashed or truncated). Debug logs are kept for at most 1 day and contain no IP.
RB-GEN-06Logs and audit records may carry an attribute name; the attribute value and the revocation list position (idx) MUST NOT.
RB-GEN-07A participant using Tamga's official @tamga-network/* packages SHOULD verify the release provenance; the packages MUST NOT contain a postinstall script.
RB-GEN-08External assurance statements use eIDAS names (Low / Substantial / High; EAA, QEAA equivalent, public-sector attestation); no numeric level is shown to the user (SHOULD).
RB-GEN-09Every participant MUST notify the scheme owner of a critical incident that concerns it within 4 hours at most, and of a high-severity incident within 24 hours at most.
RB-GEN-10In the list stage every participant knows that registrations rest on a single operator's signature and that a revocation takes effect within a few minutes (publication interval + the verifier's prefetch interval); these limits are notified to people in writing.

2. RB-OP — Operator and list operator (TLSO) ​

Today: operated by a provisional operator on behalf of Tamga Network (foundation to be established); the lists name the operator "Tamga Network" (RB-OP-01). At hand-over the role passes to the national authority.

#Rule
RB-OP-01Every list (lotl, tl-<cc>) MUST carry operator {name, status, on_behalf_of}; for the duration of the provisional operation, status = "provisional".
RB-OP-02List versions MUST increase monotonically and carry previous_version_hash; no row is deleted, status changes are appended to status_history.
RB-OP-03next_update MUST be at most 90 days; the list is re-signed even without changes; a change MUST be published within 24 hours at most.
RB-OP-04The anchor log (anchors.jsonl) MUST be signed hourly (also when nothing changed); each line carries previous_hash; no line is deleted.
RB-OP-05Lists MUST be signed with at least two rolling certificates; rotation is announced at least 30 days ahead; the new key is signed with the old one.
RB-OP-06Root fingerprints MUST be published with identical values in keys/root-fingerprints.json, on the permanent page tamga.network/trust-anchor, in the Trust Framework and in the contract annexes.
RB-OP-07A public change log (CHANGELOG.md) MUST be kept: who, when, what (addition, suspension, removal, authority), reason code.
RB-OP-08The operator MUST NOT hold signing keys in any service it hosts (the issuer's signing and revocation list keys belong to the institution).
RB-OP-09The operator MUST NOT offer a hosted list-indexing service; it publishes the indexing software as open source. A hosted verifier (intermediary) may be offered; its rules are in RB-OP-17.
RB-OP-10The list of hosted issuers is public; if their share exceeds 30%, the matter goes on the council's agenda.
RB-OP-11Credential type and revocation list usage statistics are kept only in aggregate; groups smaller than 50 are not published; no counters are kept per issuer, verifier or credential; raw counters are kept for at most 13 months.
RB-OP-12The transparency report MUST be published every three months, without delay.
RB-OP-13Once the foundation is formed the domain name is registered to it, until then to the provisional operator; transfer lock and DNSSEC apply; it is renewed at least 10 years ahead; it is bound by the succession agreement.
RB-OP-14Organization of Turkic States first: a place MUST exist for every national list and every ARF role (even if empty); hand-over changes only the operator field; ca_id, issuer_id and vct MUST NOT change.
RB-OP-15The shared ledger MUST NOT be set up without the written acceptance of at least two independent ledger operators; the move is not complete until the replay of the list archive and the equivalence test have passed.
RB-OP-16Published schema files (schemas.) MUST be immutable; re-formatting on the content delivery network is switched off; the record (anchor) is made after publication.
RB-OP-17The hosted verifier MUST open endpoints that return values only to the verifier that opened the presentation, with a statement signed with its key from the trusted list and valid for at most 60 seconds; values are given at most once and for at most 5 minutes; not even the existence of a response leaks to another verifier; a token sent to the browser MUST NOT carry the right to read values.
RB-OP-18External access to the hosted issuing service MUST be only with an API key bound to the institution and limited in scope; the key is stored on the server only as a digest and appears in no log or audit record; the key is valid only for that institution's account.

3. RB-REG — Registrar ​

#Rule
RB-REG-01The registrar records, it does not approve: legal authority (to award diplomas, etc.) lies outside the network; the network holds only the scope within the network.
RB-REG-02National registers MUST be written only by the owner of that national register (the state; today the provisional operator on behalf of the state).
RB-REG-03A new issuer MUST be attached only to a root certificate in ACTIVE status.
RB-REG-04Credential type authority is granted through an allow-list, closed by default; it is granted for a time window and according to the "who may issue" rule of the credential type rulebook.
RB-REG-05The registration class and assurance (class, assurance) are written according to the onboarding gate; the category mark only for the public and qualified classes.
RB-REG-06A certificate change MUST be recorded with a new issuer_id and a successor_id; the old entry is not deleted.
RB-REG-07Removal or exit MUST NOT invalidate existing entries and credentials; the revocation list of an issuer in REVOKED status may be published by its successor. Suspension differs: credentials of a suspended issuer MUST NOT be accepted while the suspension lasts; once it is lifted, those issued before it are accepted again (ADR-0088).
RB-REG-08A verifier is registered with a scope; the scope goes through a data minimisation review (SHOULD).
RB-REG-09A registration change SHOULD be made within 5 working days.

4. RB-AP — Issuer ​

4.1 Identity and keys ​

#Rule
RB-AP-01The issuer's identity MUST be an X.509 certificate chaining to the national root certificate; issuer_id is derived from the fingerprint of the leaf certificate.
RB-AP-02The credential signing key MUST be under the institution's control (in an HSM at I3); it MUST NOT be held at Tamga. In the hosted issuing service, signatures are requested from the institution's remote signing service (CSC API v2); only the digest of the data to be signed MUST be sent, and the service MUST verify the returned signature against the institution's certificate in the trust list.
RB-AP-03The revocation list signing key MUST be separate from the credential key.
RB-AP-04Signatures and key attestations use only ES256 (P-256).

4.2 Issuance ​

#Rule
RB-AP-05Every vct in the issuer's metadata MUST be a type the issuer is authorised for in its registration.
RB-AP-06In the pre-authorised flow a transaction code (tx_code) is MUST; it is sent through a channel separate from the offer; the channel address comes only from the institution's registered data; after three wrong attempts the offer becomes invalid.
RB-AP-07An offer link is single-use; an offer shown on screen is valid for 5 minutes, an offer sent through a separate channel for at most 72 hours.
RB-AP-08Consumption of the single-use value (c_nonce) is atomic; the access token is valid for at most 5 minutes.
RB-AP-09Each copy issued in a batch MUST be bound to a different device key (10 copies); the mapping between copy and revocation list position (idx) stays with the issuer and never leaves it.
RB-AP-10Before issuing, the issuer MUST verify the wallet's wallet instance attestation (WIA (Wallet Instance Attestation)A short-lived statement signed by the wallet provider that a wallet installation is genuine; issuers check it before issuing.) and key attestation (KA) against the wallet_providers[] list and check that the secure hardware level meets the type's requirement.
RB-AP-11Before issuing, the issuer MUST ensure the identity proofing level the type requires; the binding path is written to the audit record and MUST NOT be written to the credential. T3 is achieved only through the authorisation code flow or in person.
RB-AP-12If the credential subject differs from the applicant, proof of representation MUST be given (parent, proxy).
RB-AP-13Issuance MUST stop for a source value that has no match in the mapping table; no guesses are made.
RB-AP-14The category attribute is written only if the registration class is public or qualified, and with the same value as the registration; at I1–I2 it MUST NOT. The holder's identity proofing level MUST NOT appear in any attribute.
RB-AP-15After issuance a "your credential was added to a wallet; if this was not you …" notice MUST be sent to the person (with minimal personal data).
RB-AP-16Error responses contain no personal data; the transaction code is not stored outside the response.
RB-AP-26If an issuer wants an institution credential type to be shown only to specific relying parties, it MUST publish the rule (embedded disclosure policy) by value in its signed metadata, in the credential configuration; the rule MUST NOT go into the credential. If the rule is added, changed or removed, the issuer MUST revoke the valid credentials issued under that configuration. Identity and contact credentials carry no rule. The rule is announced to relying parties in this rulebook and in the type's rulebook.

4.3 Revocation list ​

#Rule
RB-AP-17The revocation list MUST be published at a fixed interval, also without changes; "urgent" publication outside the interval MUST NOT happen.
RB-AP-18The position (idx) is random; the address is opaque (it encodes no institution, year or group); lists are split by no criterion other than type; capacity at least 100,000, fill at most 80%; bits = 2, and bits = 1 in the identity service's lists (ADR-0048); version increases monotonically.
RB-AP-19Publication goes first to the content delivery network, then to the anchor log (in the ledger stage, the shared ledger); there is no revocation bit in the list, only the anchor.
RB-AP-20A suspended issuer MUST NOT publish a revocation list; its successor may.
RB-AP-21If the person withdraws consent, the credential MUST be revoked.
RB-AP-22The issuer MUST back up its credential records and the revocation list mapping regularly; this backup takes priority over the shared list or ledger backup, because revocation is only possible with these records.
RB-AP-27An issuer MAY publish conditions in addition to the network's common revocation policy (FW-POL-0001) on its own page; the link is in the revocation_policy_uri field of its trust list entry. The additional conditions MUST NOT narrow the common conditions. Wallet unit revocation does not revoke institution credentials (ADR-0047 K1).
RB-AP-28An issuer uses suspension (0x02 in the status list) only for types whose schema has suspension_allowed: true; for other types it MUST NOT use suspension. The status list of a type also issued as mdoc MUST also be published as a CWT representation (application/statuslist+cwt) at a separate, opaque address with the same bits; the mdoc copy points to the CWT address, the SD-JWT copy to the JWT address (ADR-0048 K2, K3; packages 0.6.0).

4.4 Remote identity verification providers ​

#Rule
RB-AP-23If a remote identity verification provider is used, the issuer MUST store only the result summary (level, session identifier, time, provider); document images, face data and raw OCR data MUST NOT be kept in the issuer's system.
RB-AP-24The provider's result is mapped to a T level; the mapping follows the table in SPEC-ID-0003; the level is not passed to the verifier.
RB-AP-25An institution using the hosted service MUST keep its API key on its own server (not in a browser, wallet or code); the key is renewed every 90 days (two keys are valid together for a while); on suspicion of a leak the institution requests revocation.

4.5 RB-AP-ID — Identity credential provider ​

#Rule
RB-AP-ID-01The identity credential provider MUST carry out remote identity verification only in its own service; institutions' issuing services, the wallet and the verifier MUST NOT talk to the remote identity verification provider. A wallet MAY read the identity document chip on the device that started the flow and relay the raw data unchanged to the identity credential provider; it MUST NOT verify chip data or make an identity verification decision (ADR-0083).
RB-AP-ID-02Before issuance the information notice MUST be shown and explicit consent obtained; without consent, identity verification MUST NOT start.
RB-AP-ID-03Personal attributes MUST NOT be kept after issuance; images, selfies, video and raw OCR data MUST NOT be stored; the permanent record is only the opaque subject_ref, the digest of the document number, the validity period and the revocation list positions.
RB-AP-ID-04The credential MUST be of type urn:tamga:id:IdentityAttestation:1, without a category attribute, with a revocation list and valid for at most 2 years; the national identity number MUST be selectively disclosable.
RB-AP-ID-05A second active identity credential MUST NOT be issued for the same document number; re-verification revokes the earlier one.
RB-AP-ID-06When the state's PID Provider is appointed, the provider MUST hand over its entry with successor_id and stop issuing; existing credentials remain valid until they expire.
RB-AP-ID-07Together with the identity credential, a per-site pseudonymA stable account identifier the wallet derives separately for each website; two sites cannot link the same person. seed MUST be issued in a separate type that cannot be presented (urn:tamga:id:PseudonymSeed:1); the seed is derived from the person's unchanging identity with a key separate from the credential digest key and MUST NOT be stored (it is recomputed at every verification); this type MUST NOT appear in any verifier's scope.
RB-AP-ID-08Driving licence information (urn:tamga:id:DrivingLicenceAttestation:1) MUST NOT use the official mDL docType or namespace and MUST state in its metadata, in the always-visible not_official_licence claim, on its card and in the verification result that it is not a substitute for an official driving licence; the national ID number, restriction or health codes, photo and address MUST NOT be carried; the document number is a keyed hash only.
RB-AP-ID-09Driving licence information MUST be issued only upon presentation of an active Tamga identity credential from the wallet and only if the name and date of birth on the card match that identity; it MUST NOT be issued if the categories cannot be read or the card has expired; its validity MUST NOT exceed the card's expiry or one year from the day the card was inspected; its format is SD-JWT VC only.
RB-AP-ID-10When the linked identity credential is revoked, re-issued or erased, the driving licence information MUST be revoked or erased; once a country's competent authority starts issuing digital driving licences, this type MUST NOT be re-issued for that country.
RB-AP-ID-11For zero-knowledge presentation the ZK copy MUST be issued as a separate type (urn:tamga:id:ShortLivedIdentityAttestation:1), valid for at most 24 hours and without a revocation list entry; it carries only elements that can be proven with ZK; it MUST NOT be issued while the main identity credential is revoked. The refresh token MUST NOT leave person fields on the server (only in the token, in a form only the service can open).
RB-AP-ID-12The identity credential provider keeps the status list entry of the WIA it saw at issuance in the credential record, checks the wallet provider's WIA list at least once a day and, if the unit has been revoked, MUST revoke all copies tied to that record within 24 hours at most (EU WURevocation_18). The entry is deleted when the record is revoked or expires.
RB-AP-ID-13The identity service MUST NOT suspend credentials of its types: the status is only valid or revoked, revocation is permanent, and the status lists of these types are published with bits = 1 (the EU PID rule, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2979 Annex II; ADR-0048 K1; packages 0.6.0).

5. RB-AS — Authentic source ​

#Rule
RB-AS-01The authentic source is named in the issuer's agreement and bound by a data processing agreement.
RB-AS-02The mapping of source data to the schema (ISCED-F, EQF, etc.) is documented; no credential is issued for a record without a match.
RB-AS-03The national identity number is not carried into any network-wide shared schema.
RB-AS-04The pilot does not place regular new work on the source institution's staff (SHOULD).

6. RB-WP — Wallet provider ​

#Rule
RB-WP-01The holder's keys MUST be generated in the device's secure area (W2) or in certified secure hardware (W3); they cannot be exported and are not derived from a seed. Credentials MUST NOT be issued to a wallet with software keys (W1).
RB-WP-02The wallet instance attestation (WIA) MUST state the wallet version, that the key is in hardware and that PIN or biometrics are active; the wallet provider's key is in the wallet_providers[] list.
RB-WP-03Every presentation MUST require PIN or biometric approval.
RB-WP-04The consent screen shows the requested attributes one by one; for requests beyond the verifier's scope or excessive requests, a separate visual block and a delayed button are MUST.
RB-WP-05The same copy is always shown to a given verifier and a different copy to a different verifier; the attributes disclosed to the same verifier for the same type are consistent.
RB-WP-06The presentation log stays on the device; it is never sent to a server. Only the person can export it, as a file encrypted with their own password (EU TS10).
RB-WP-07The wallet takes no backup of credentials; credentials are bound to the device and do not move, and on a device change they are issued again. Only the migration file started by the person leaves the device; it carries no credential values and no keys. The wallet provider MUST NOT hold a recovery key on the user's behalf.
RB-WP-08Schemas are fetched in bulk; requests to the schema server MUST NOT be made at presentation time. Credentials are refreshed without user action only under the conditions of ADR-0023.
RB-WP-09The wallet tries to resolve the verifier's client identifier in the trust source; presentation_definition is rejected; unencrypted response modes are not used; an origin prefix is not accepted as a client identifier.
RB-WP-10The wallet MUST offer a "where are my keys" explanation and the "Listed on Tamga Network" indicator that shows its entry in the trusted list (RB-WP-18).
RB-WP-11If a flaw is found in a wallet solution, the wallet provider MUST be able to revoke wallet attestations by version; on a breach of a single wallet unit it revokes that unit.
RB-WP-12"Invalid" and "cannot be verified / stale" are shown differently to the user; a used offer gets a clear message.
RB-WP-13For a request coming through an intermediaryA service that verifies credentials on behalf of a relying party; the wallet shows both the intermediary and the relying party it serves. verifier, the wallet MUST show the registered name of the actual verifier, check the scope against that verifier's registration and separate the per-verifier copy according to the actual verifier.
RB-WP-14The wallet MUST store the issuer's sharing rule (embedded disclosure policy) at issuance and evaluate it at presentation, without network requests, against the relying party's registration and access certificates; if the rule does not hold or cannot be evaluated, it MUST show a separate warning on the consent screen, the default choice being not to share; the final decision is the person's.
RB-WP-15The wallet provider MUST offer a way for the person to revoke the wallet unit without having the phone; the way MUST NOT require a user account (for example a revocation secret shown once at activation, of which the provider keeps only a slow hash; ADR-0047 K3).
RB-WP-16The wallet provider MUST offer at least one way, outside the wallet, for the person to learn that their wallet unit was revoked; if the provider revoked the unit on its own decision, this way shows within 24 hours at most the reason, what keeps working and what the person can do (EU WURevocation_14/16; ADR-0047 K4).
RB-WP-17At level W3 the wallet provider MUST verify the platform's device attestation (Apple App Attest, Android key attestation, Play Integrity) when activating the unit and before every key attestation that declares W3; at W2 device attestation is optional (MAY) (ADR-0047 K5).
RB-WP-18A wallet in the trusted list shows the "Tamga Network'te listeli" / "Listed on Tamga Network" indicator as text only; a logo, the EU stars and colours, and the words "trust mark" MUST NOT be used. Tapping the indicator shows the wallet_providers[] entry in the list whose signature has been verified. The indicator MUST be hidden if the wallet unit is revoked, if the provider or solution entry is not ACTIVE, if the list cannot be verified, or if the wallet is attached only to the sandbox list (ADR-0049).
RB-WP-19A request without a registration certificate MUST be rejected; the wallet stops without asking the person (wallet-to-wallet proximity excepted). In proximity the registration certificate comes in euWrprc and goes through the same checks (ADR-0026 K5; ADR-0056 K10, 2026-10-19; packages 0.7.0).

7. RB-RP — Verifier (relying party) ​

#Rule
RB-RP-01A verifier MUST be registered (relying_parties[]) with the domain name in its access certificate (dns_name); requests use client_id = x509_hash: (HAIP 1.0 §5); it MUST NOT request attributes beyond its scope.
RB-RP-02The request object MUST be signed; only the DCQL query language is used; the response comes with direct_post.jwt (encrypted); the single-use value (nonce) is unique; one request asks for at most 3 credentials and 2 credential sets.
RB-RP-03Verification MUST use the canonical verification pipeline of the specification (freshness of the trust source, then steps A–E: signature, issuer, credential type authority, revocation, wallet binding). The credential type authority check cannot be skipped by any configuration; the issuer and type authority checks look at the credential's issue date (iat).
RB-RP-04issuer_id is derived from the fingerprint of the x5c leaf certificate, not from the iss attribute.
RB-RP-05The result has three values; INDETERMINATE MUST NOT be handled like REJECTED; the result object carries the checks performed and skipped (checks_performed, checks_skipped).
RB-RP-06A verifier does not fetch revocation lists at every verification; it fetches them in bulk ahead of time; exp and ttl take precedence over the HTTP cache.
RB-RP-07A verifier runs its own list indexer or trust source cache; it does not expect a hosted indexing service from Tamga.
RB-RP-08The result object and logs carry no attribute values and no revocation list positions; an audit record is also kept for rejected verifications; the HTTP status code does not encode the result.
RB-RP-09Policy is expressed as "credential type × issuer class"; a verifier does not expect a separate holder assurance field; additional identity checks for high-risk transactions are the verifier's responsibility.
RB-RP-10The reason for a rejection does not leak to the verifier (wallet side); a verifier SHOULD NOT use wording that blames the user when the result is "cannot be verified".
RB-RP-11If face matching is needed, the verifier does it with an identity credential or PID; diplomas and student certificates carry no photo.
RB-RP-12A verifier using the hosted verifier MUST open the presentation from its own server with a statement signed with its key from the trusted list, and read the values on its own server; the page sees only the status.
RB-RP-13Signing in to a website ("Sign in with Tamga") MUST use the per-site pseudonym as the account key; site policies MUST NOT request a credential digest or identity number; the pseudonym is verified with the signature, aud and nonce, the site and an unrevoked wallet instance (WIA). Several pseudonyms are used only on a site whose registration contains pseudonyms: "multiple".
RB-RP-14If the intended use has a registration certificate, the verifier MUST send that use's single registration certificate in every request in verifier_info as {"format": "registration_cert", "data": "<jwt>"}; credential_ids and registrar_dataset are not used (ADR-0026 change of 2026-10-13).
RB-RP-ID-01An institution that receives the identity credential to match it with its own records (including an issuing service) MUST receive it only with the attributes in its registered verifier scope and through the full verification pipeline; it MUST NOT store or log the matching keys.

8. RB-H — Holder (the person): rights and obligations ​

#Rule
RB-H-01Participation is voluntary; consent can be withdrawn at any time, in which case the credential is revoked.
RB-H-02At every presentation the person sees which attributes are requested and approves them one by one; out-of-scope requests are flagged.
RB-H-03The person can view the presentation log on their device and export it as a password-protected file; the log leaves the device in no other way.
RB-H-04The person is responsible for the PIN, biometrics and device security; on device loss the credentials are obtained again, the key is not recovered.
RB-H-05The person has the right to object to the "your credential was added to a wallet" notice; on objection the issuer revokes the credential and issues it again.
RB-H-06The person has no global identifier; verifiers cannot combine presentations (a separate copy per verifier). Linkability on the issuer side is notified in writing as a residual risk.
RB-H-07Complaints: issuer → scheme owner → the KVKK authority. The wallet SHOULD show this path to the person.

9. RB-SCH — Types and schemas ​

#Rule
RB-SCH-01The type identifier is vct = urn:tamga:<domain>:<Type>:<major>; vct#integrity is MUST; the type definition (Type Metadata) comes from the catalogue; in the ledger stage the schema identifier is computed as schema_id = keccak256(vct).
RB-SCH-02A published type definition or JSON Schema MUST NOT change; minor and patch versions mean a new metadata_url and digest, a major version means a new URN.
RB-SCH-03Every network-wide shared schema carries at least tr-TR and en-US display information; additionalProperties: false; a personal data attribute cannot be sd: never.
RB-SCH-04No network-wide shared schema may contain a national identity number attribute.
RB-SCH-05A new domain is not opened until the seven-condition checklist (SG1–SG7) is complete; a rulebook is published for each type (for example the Education Rulebook).
RB-SCH-06A schema in DEPRECATED status remains verifiable; the retirement decision is made with aggregate statistics (groups of at least 50).
RB-SCH-07The extends chain is acyclic and at most 5 levels deep; extends#integrity is mandatory except for the root type.

10. RB-ENF — Conformance and enforcement ​

#Rule
RB-ENF-01Conformance vectors and commitment tests are mandatory before release; a component that fails them is not taken into production.
RB-ENF-02Sanctions ladder: warning → narrowing of authority → suspension → removal (with a successor appointed) → termination. Removal does not invalidate earlier credentials.
RB-ENF-03If a stop condition arises in the pilot, the pilot stops; there is no "let's watch and see". Writing personal data to a shared register is a reason to stop immediately.
RB-ENF-04Every deviation from these rules is kept in the operator's deviation record with its reason and closing date; an unrecorded deviation is a breach.
RB-ENF-05If an item of this Rulebook conflicts with its source document, the source prevails and the Rulebook is corrected.

11. The EU Attestation Rulebook template and ARF Topic 12 ​

Credential type rulebooks follow the section structure of the EU Attestation Rulebook template (version 1.5, 2026-07-08): 1 Introduction · 2 Attributes and metadata (mandatory, optional, conditional) · 3 Encoding (ISO/IEC 18013-5, SD-JWT VC, W3C VCDM) · 4 Usage · 5 Trust anchors · 6 Revocation (in Tamga "Validity and revocation") · 7 Compliance · 8 References. Tamga-specific topics (who issues, identity proofing, data protection, verification policies) are in Chapter 4. The requirements of ARF Annex 2 Topic 12 that apply to a non-qualified EAA are met as follows:

ARFRequirementIn the rulebook
ARB_01a, ARB_01bOne of the common formats; the HAIP profile for SD-JWT VC§3.2 (all types SD-JWT VC), §3.1 (identity credential also mdoc)
ARB_02Analysis of whether offline proximity presentation is needed§3.1
ARB_05A unique identifier of the type in the networkvct URN (RB-SCH-01); the mdoc docType is the same value
ARB_06, ARB_06a, ARB_06bFormat-independent definition of all attributes; mdoc namespace; claim names that are IANA, common or type-specific names§2, §3
ARB_07, ARB_08Using existing attributes and naming conventionsEU PID names (ADR-0045), OpenID Connect, ISO/IEC 18013-5, ELM
ARB_09Each attribute mandatory, optional or conditional§2.2–§2.7
ARB_12, ARB_25Legal category indicator (category; in the ARF text attestation_legal_category)§2.1 — only in the qualified or public class, with Tamga values (RB-AP-14). A non-qualified EAA carries no category; the template's value eaa:eu:non-qualified is not used, because ETSI TS 119 472-1 V1.2.1 EAA-5.2.2.1-01 requires that such a credential has no category (ADR-0047 K6)
ARB_15, ARB_17, ARB_19, ARB_21Counterparts of eIDAS 2.0 Annex V b, c, e, h§2.0. For Annex V h (location of the trust anchor) no field is added to the credential: the location is the issuer's x5c chain and the trust lists; the lists are the single source of trust anchors (ADR-0047 K7)
ARB_22The technical detail needed for interoperability, security and privacyThe rulebook and the specifications it rests on (Annex E)
ARB_24, ARB_24aWhether the type is revocable, the mechanism, the list address§6 and FW-POL-0001
ARB_26How the verifier obtains the trust anchor§5
ARB_29The rulebook follows the structure of the EU templateAll credential type rulebooks
ARB_30, ARB_31Selective disclosure rule for each claim; Type Metadata§3.2; the type definition is in the catalogue (RB-SCH-01)
ARB_34Whether it is device-bound§4 — all types are device-bound

Requirements specific to a qualified or public EAA and to the EU catalogue (ARB_01, ARB_11, ARB_13, ARB_14, ARB_16, ARB_18, ARB_20, ARB_23, ARB_33) do not apply to Tamga credentials. Of the optional requirements, ARB_10 (a type-specific mdoc namespace) is used in the identity credential (tamga.id.1); ARB_03 and ARB_04 (W3C VCDM) and ARB_28 (cryptographically_bound_to) are not used.


Table — Rules by role (summary) ​

TopicOPREGAPASWPRPH
No personal data (shared registers and logs)✓✓✓✓✓✓—
Reading trust data per the specification✓—✓—✓✓—
Key separation and control✓—✓—✓—✓ (device)
Publication interval (list, anchor, revocation list)✓—✓————
Identity proofing level——✓——(additional check)—
Scope and data minimisation—✓——✓ (warning)✓✓ (consent)
Three-valued result————✓✓—
Transparency and threshold alerts✓——————

References ​

The decisions, specifications and standards this document rests on are listed in Annex E.

Status ​

Active — version 1.0.0 (16 October 2026).

Tamga ARF 1.0 · CC BY 4.0 · The Turkish text is the source; this is its official translation