Risk Register
This document shows, for every risk and threat in the EU wallet risk register, Tamga's measure and its status; it is for regulators, states, auditors and participants.
Self-assessment. This register is Tamga's own assessment; it is not an independent audit, a conformity assessment or a certificate. "Met" is used only for measures backed by a binding rule and present in the reference implementation.
When to read it. First the security section of the main document (FW-ARF-0001 §7) and the risk approach of the Trust Framework (FW-TF-0001 §1.5). The rules behind the measures are in the Tamga Rulebook (FW-RB-0001) and in the cited specifications and decisions.
1. Source and method
The EU collects the risks that every wallet architecture must address in a common risk register: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2981, Annex I (Annex 6 of the EU ARF). It has four sections: high-level risks (R1–R14), system-related risks (SR1–SR3), technical threats (TT1–TT5 with subcategories) and direct threat scenarios (TR1–TR133). This document follows the same skeleton; codes and titles are those of the regulation.
Tamga Network does not operate a wallet (ADR-0042); for wallet-side rows the measure is the set of rules the Tamga Rulebook places on listed wallet providersThe organisation that offers a wallet, registers its wallet units and signs wallet and key attestations. Each wallet runs its own provider; the network does not run one, it lists them in the trusted list. (RB-WP) and the open-source Tamga wallet core.
| Column | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Who | The role responsible for the measure: operator (the network's provisional operator), identity service (Tamga's provisional identity credential service; not a PID), issuer, verifier, wallet provider |
| Measure in Tamga | A short description and the source of the rule (DOC-ID/CODE or a Tamga Rulebook rule code) |
| Status | Met: binding rule and present in the reference implementation · Partly: a measure exists but is incomplete, not yet verified on phones or not certified · Open: no measure · Not applicable: the function the threat relies on does not exist in Tamga |
Threats about the PID were read as applying to Tamga's provisional identity credential (Tamga issues no PID — SPEC-TRUST-0001/TL8).
2. Counts
| Section | Met | Partly | Open | Not applicable |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High-level risks (14) | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| System-related risks (3) | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Technical threat subcategories (18) | 2 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| Threat scenarios (133) | 32 | 89 | 3 | 9 |
No high-level risk is counted as fully met: each has at least one scenario that is partly met or open. Open scenarios: TR49, TR63, TR132 (integrity of the wallet log and loss of the log on device failure). Not applicable: TR7, TR11, TR45, TR48, TR54, TR64, TR97, TR100, TR101 (paths that do not exist in Tamga: proofing with a qualified certificate or eID means, electronic signatures, qualified trust services, wallet backup, user accounts).
3. High-level risks
| Code | Risk | Main measures in Tamga | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | Creation or use of an existing electronic identity | The identity credential is issued only after licensed remote identity proofing and the person's final confirmation in the wallet that started the flow; copies are bound to keys the wallet proves. No independent audit. | Partly |
| R2 | Creation or use of a fake electronic identity | Tamga issues no PID; the identity service is registered in the trusted list with a credential-type authorisation; an unauthorised type is rejected in verification. The list signature rests with a single operator today. | Partly |
| R3 | Creation or use of fake attributes | Every credential is signed, the signer is in the trusted list and the type authorisation cannot be skipped; holder binding is mandatory. Fabrication inside an institution is under the institution's own controls. | Partly |
| R4 | Identity theft | Keys in the device's secure area, every presentation with user verification; unit revocation without the phone. No certified secure hardware (W3). | Partly |
| R5 | Data theft | No personal data in shared records; responses are encrypted; the log stays on the device and leaves only in the person's encrypted export; no wallet backup. | Partly |
| R6 | Data disclosure | Selective disclosure, field-by-field consent, scope check, mandatory registration certificate; linkage remains possible if credentials of the same issuer are combined (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L3). | Partly |
| R7 | Data manipulation | Credentials are signed; the acceptance decision is in the verifier's own pipeline. The wallet log has no integrity protection. | Partly |
| R8 | Data loss | There is deliberately no wallet backup; credentials are issued again on a new device, the log moves only with the migration file. | Partly |
| R9 | Unauthorised transaction | Signed request, registration certificate, single-use nonce, user verification for every presentation; phishing cannot be ruled out entirely. | Partly |
| R10 | Transaction manipulation | Request, response and credential are signed and encrypted; open: proof that the credentials of a multi-credential presentation belong to the same person (TR86). | Partly |
| R11 | Repudiation | KB-JWT and the device signature evidence the presentation; the verifier's audit record is kept for rejections too. The log is lost if the device fails. | Partly |
| R12 | Transaction data disclosure | The presentation log stays on the device; verifier results and logs carry no field values and no status-list position; IP addresses are not logged. | Partly |
| R13 | Service disruption | A stale or unreachable trust source yields "indeterminate", never acceptance; status lists are static and fetched in bulk; no load or outage testing yet. | Partly |
| R14 | Surveillance | No global identifier; a copy per verifier, a pseudonym per site, zero-knowledge proofs; status lists at a fixed interval and in bulk. | Partly |
4. System-related risks
Under the regulation these risks are the system-level result of several threats; they are not mapped to threat scenarios.
| Code | Risk | Main measures in Tamga | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| SR1 | Wholesale surveillance | No central service sees transactions: trusted lists and status lists are fetched in bulk, the presentation log stays on the device, shared records hold no personal data. Against colluding verifiers, zero-knowledge proofs exist only for the identity credential. | Partly |
| SR2 | Reputational damage | Incident notification deadlines, a public change log and a quarterly transparency report; no independent audit or certification. | Partly |
| SR3 | Legal non-compliance | The network is not bound by EU law but follows the EU model; personal-data rules are protected by binding rules; the legal review of the framework is due before the pilot. | Partly |
5. Technical threats
Technical threats are not tied to a single risk; they are means for many attacks.
| Code | Threat | Measure in Tamga | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| TT1 1.1 | Theft | User verification for every presentation; unit revocation without the phone (RB-WP-15). | Partly |
| TT1 1.2 | Information leakage | Data on the device; platform encrypted storage; values are not logged (RB-GEN-06). | Partly |
| TT1 1.3 | Tampering | Device attestation and per-version revocation of wallet attestations (RB-WP-11, RB-WP-17). | Partly |
| TT2 2.1 | Errors made when managing an IT system | Mandatory pre-release tests (RB-ENF-01), deviation register (RB-ENF-04); operating policies. | Partly |
| TT2 2.2 | Application-level errors or usage errors | "Invalid" and "indeterminate" are shown differently (RB-WP-12); three-valued result (RB-RP-05). | Partly |
| TT2 2.3 | Development-time errors and system misconfigurations | Open conformance vectors, secure defaults (ADR-0056), open source; no independent code audit. | Partly |
| TT3 3.1 | Erroneous use or configuration of wallet components | Release provenance for packages (RB-GEN-07); stop on an unknown list format (RB-GEN-04). | Partly |
| TT4 4.1 | Failure or dysfunction of equipment, devices or systems | "Indeterminate" on a stale source (RB-GEN-03); credentials are issued again after a device failure (RB-H-04). | Partly |
| TT4 4.2 | Loss of resources | Static publication of lists and status lists; a single operator (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L1). | Partly |
| TT4 4.3 | Loss of support services | Verifiers prefetch lists in bulk (RB-RP-06); offline presentation in proximity. | Partly |
| TT5 5.1 | Interception of information | TLS, encrypted response (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3), session encryption in proximity. | Met |
| TT5 5.2 | Phishing and spoofing | Mandatory registration certificate (RB-WP-19), the registered name shown (RB-WP-13), final confirmation against link relay (ADR-0080/VL1). | Partly |
| TT5 5.3 | Replay of messages | Single-use nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV10), KB-JWT iat window (SPEC-CRED-0002/C17), single-use c_nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR4). | Met |
| TT5 5.4 | Brute-force attack | Three attempts for the transaction code (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR12), salt ≥ 128 bits (SPEC-CRED-0002/C3); request limits on services. | Partly |
| TT5 5.5 | Software vulnerabilities | Open source, a responsible disclosure channel, per-version revocation (RB-WP-11); no independent audit. | Partly |
| TT5 5.6 | Supply chain attacks | Release provenance for packages (RB-GEN-07); dependency review. | Partly |
| TT5 5.7 | Malware | Keys in the secure area (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1); device attestation. | Partly |
| TT5 5.8 | Random number prediction | The platform's cryptographic generator; random status position (SPEC-CRED-0003/S7). | Partly |
6. Threat scenarios
The "Related risk" column is the mapping in the regulation; TR106–TR133 are marked there as "effect on various risks".
| Code | Threat scenario | Related risk | Who | Measure in Tamga | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TR1 | An attacker can revoke pseudonyms without justified reason. | R2 | Identity service, Wallet provider | Site pseudonyms are derived on the device from a seed; there is no central pseudonym revocation list; the seed is not stored by the identity service (ADR-0031/PS2). | Met |
| TR2 | An attacker can issue fabricated electronic identities that do not exist. | R2 | Identity service | The identity credential is not issued before the type's level is met (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP2, RB-AP-11); no independent audit. | Partly |
| TR3 | An attacker can start to issue unauthorised PIDs. | R2 | Operator | Tamga issues no PID (SPEC-TRUST-0001/TL8); type authorisation is an allow-list, closed by default (RB-REG-04), and cannot be skipped in verification (SPEC-API-0001/AP8). | Met |
| TR4 | An attacker can get an administrator to enter a wrong PID provider into the PID provider trusted list. | R2 | Operator | Entry into the list follows the onboarding review (FW-ONB-0001); every change is in the public change log (RB-OP-07). The list is signed by a single operator; the key ceremony and hardware security module are pending (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L1). | Partly |
| TR5 | An attacker can bypass the remote identity proofing service. | R1 / R2 | Identity service | Document, liveness and face checks with a licensed provider; the provider's decision is confirmed through the signed notification and the decision query (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP5); final confirmation against link relay (ADR-0080/VL1–VL3). | Partly |
| TR6 | An attacker can bypass the physical identity proofing service. | R1 / R2 | Identity service | The in-person path is defined at level T2 in the identity rulebook (FW-RB-0003); the in-person procedure itself is not written down yet. | Partly |
| TR7 | An attacker can bypass the identity proofing services related to the use of a remote (qualified) certificate. | R1 / R2 | Identity service | This path is not offered; level T3, which rests on a qualified signature, is not issued today (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP7). | Not applicable |
| TR8 | An attacker can get access to a wallet that is not bound to a person. | R1 / R2 | Wallet provider | Every presentation needs user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11, RB-WP-03); credentials are issued after the person's identity proofing. Binding the wallet to the person rests on the device's user verification. | Partly |
| TR9 | An attacker can defeat technical and procedural controls to create wrong PIDs. | R1 / R2 | Identity service | Issuance stops for a value with no entry in the mapping table (RB-AP-13); the issuer's audit record; no independent audit. | Partly |
| TR10 | An attacker can activate a new wallet on an invalid WSCD. | R1 / R2 | Wallet provider | Software-key wallets are not supported (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL3); the key attestation states the storage level truthfully (ADR-0025/WIA3); a W3 claim requires device attestation (RB-WP-17). No certified WSCD. | Partly |
| TR11 | An attacker can bypass the identity proofing service related to the use of existing eID means. | R1 / R2 | Identity service | There is no proofing path through eID means; reading the identity document chip is switched off (ADR-0083/CV7). | Not applicable |
| TR12 | An attacker can circumvent the verification by the PID provider that the wallet is controlled by the user and have a PID issued into a compromised wallet under the attacker's control. | R1 / R4 / R9 | Identity service, Wallet provider | WIA and key attestation are checked before issuance (RB-AP-10, SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR11, PR19); the person confirms the masked summary in the wallet that started the flow (ADR-0080/VL1). Device attestation is optional at W2. | Partly |
| TR13 | An attacker can get a valid PID into an invalid wallet unit. | R1 / R4 / R9 | Identity service, Wallet provider | A WIA lives less than 24 hours and is new for every transaction (ADR-0025/WIA1); no credential is issued against a revoked WIA or key attestation (ADR-0025/WIA4, SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR19). | Met |
| TR14 | A PID provider can issue fabricated identities where the identity is related to an existing person. | R1 / R4 / R9 | Identity service | Identity data comes from the provider's confirmed decision (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP5); the person gets a "your credential was added to a wallet" notice (RB-AP-15). No independent audit against insider misuse; the network rests on a single operator (RB-GEN-10). | Partly |
| TR15 | An attacker can link a PID with the wrong wallet because the PID provider is not able to link the PID to the correct wallet. | R1 / R4 / R9 | Identity service | Each copy is bound to a separate key whose possession the wallet proves (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR6); the final confirmation goes only to the wallet that started the flow, bound to its key (ADR-0080/VL2). | Met |
| TR16 | An attacker can make the user approving the activation of a new wallet unit/instance under the attacker's control – with subsequent control of attestations as well. | R1 / R2 / R4 / R9 | Wallet provider | A warning before proofing starts: which wallet this proofing is for (ADR-0080/VL3); the "your credential was added to a wallet" notice and objection (RB-AP-15, RB-H-05); unit revocation without the phone (ADR-0047/WR3). | Partly |
| TR17 | An attacker can issue a PID of another state to access data / digital assets of targeted citizens. | R1 / R4 / R9 | Operator | An institution chains only to its own state's root certificate (SPEC-ID-0002/XC1, RB-REG-03); a national list is signed by that state's key (SPEC-TRUST-0001/TL7) — today the provisional operator signs all lists; the recognition check is at the verifier (RB-RP-03). | Partly |
| TR18 | An attacker can defeat technical and procedural controls to create fake (Q)EAAs. | R3 | Issuer | The signing key stays with the institution (ADR-0057/RS1, RB-AP-02); data is read from the authentic source at signing time (ADR-0020/AS1); no credential for a record without a mapping (RB-AS-02). The institution's internal controls are its own. | Partly |
| TR19 | An attacker can present (Q)EAAs that are not validly issued to them. | R3 | Verifier | KB-JWT is mandatory without exception (SPEC-CRED-0002/C8), a credential without cnf is rejected (C16); in mdoc the device signature is bound to the session (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV11); the key never leaves the secure area (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1). | Met |
| TR20 | An attacker can attack the cryptographic linking mechanism of the wallet between the PID and a (Q)EAA that should not be issued to them. | R3 | Issuer, Verifier | An institution credential is issued through an identity-bound offer (ADR-0020/AS2) or a presentation of the identity credential (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR14); but the issued credential is not cryptographically bound to the identity credential's key (each copy has its own key, PR6). That the credentials of one presentation come from the same wallet rests on the verifier's same-response check (see TR86). | Partly |
| TR21 | An attacker can use a (Q)EAA in a wallet, although the physical counterpart of the (Q)EAA is expired or invalid. | R3 | Issuer | exp in the credential and the institution's status list (SPEC-CRED-0003); on refresh the data is read again from the authentic source (ADR-0023/AR3); revocation conditions in the policy (FW-POL-0001). Turning a change at the source into a revocation depends on the institution's process. | Partly |
| TR22 | An attacker can circumvent the verification by the (Q)EAA provider that the wallet is in control of the user and have a (Q)EAA issued into a compromised wallet under the attacker's control. | R3 | Issuer, Wallet provider | The issuer checks the WIA and key attestation before issuance (RB-AP-10, SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR19); device attestation is optional at W2. | Partly |
| TR23 | An attacker can forge electronic attestations of attributes. | R3 | Verifier | ES256 signatures only (SPEC-CRED-0002/C1), the chain ends at a root in the trusted list, the institution must be acceptable at iat and the type authorisation cannot be skipped (SPEC-API-0001/AP8). | Met |
| TR24 | An attacker can inject forged electronic attestations of attributes into a wallet. | R3 | Wallet provider | The Tamga wallet core checks the signature, the institution's listing and the type digest on receipt (RB-GEN-02); a forged credential is still rejected by the verifier. Other wallets' receipt checks are their provider's job. | Partly |
| TR25 | The wallet can present attributes to a relying party without the approval of a user. | R6 | Wallet provider | Every presentation needs user verification and field-by-field consent (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11, RB-WP-03, RB-H-02); on-device verification is ongoing. | Partly |
| TR26 | PID, (Q)EAAs or pseudonyms can be presented to a wrong relying party. | R6 | Verifier, Wallet provider | The client identifier comes from the access certificate (ADR-0034/CI1, CI2); a request without a registration certificate is rejected (ADR-0056/MR5); the KB-JWT aud is the full client identifier (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV7); a pseudonym per site (ADR-0031/PS1). | Met |
| TR27 | An attacker can initiate a malicious renewal of EAA. | R6 | Issuer | The refresh token is bound to the client-instance key of the first issuance (ADR-0060/RT1), DPoP is mandatory (RT2), single use (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR18); silent refresh only under defined conditions (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL7). | Met |
| TR28 | An attacker can get a user into wrongfully approving a request for electronic attestations of attributes (phishing or other). | R6 | Wallet provider | Field-by-field consent, a separate warning for over-asking (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL8, RB-WP-04), the verifier's registered name (RB-WP-13), the disclosure-policy warning (ADR-0046/EP3). Phishing cannot be ruled out entirely. | Partly |
| TR29 | An attacker can leak attributes from the wallet and identify the wallet user where identification is not required/allowed. | R6 | Wallet provider, Verifier | Selective disclosure, age fields (ADR-0064/YE2), a pseudonym per site (RB-RP-13), zero-knowledge proofs (ADR-0032), scope check (SPEC-API-0001/AP6). Residual risk FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L3. | Partly |
| TR30 | An attacker can defeat technical and procedural controls to extract data. | R6 | Operator, Wallet provider | No personal data in shared records (RB-GEN-01, SPEC-TRUST-0001/TL11); no values in logs (RB-GEN-06); wallet data stays on the device. No independent penetration test. | Partly |
| TR31 | A request can be leaked to an attacker. | R6 | Verifier | The request is signed; each fetch of request_uri is a separate branch with a fresh state, nonce and encryption key (ADR-0067/RQ1); the response is encrypted (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3). The requested field names are visible to anyone who fetches the request object. | Partly |
| TR32 | An attacker can obtain knowledge on the embedded disclosure policy for attributes and present attributes contained in the current request by wallet units. | R6 | Issuer, Wallet provider | The policy is public in signed metadata (by design; ADR-0046/EP1); the policy does not remove the person's consent, the wallet presents only with the person's approval (EP3, SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11). | Partly |
| TR33 | An attacker can extract logs, or parts of them. | R6 | Wallet provider | The log stays on the device; it leaves only in an export the person starts, encrypted with a password (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL4, ADR-0027/LX1, LX2). Device-level protection rests on the platform. | Partly |
| TR34 | An attacker can know whether a wallet is installed on the same device he is using, or on another one, and get information on it. | R6 | Wallet provider | The WIA sub is shared by all instances of the same wallet solution (ADR-0034/CI6); no endpoint reveals the wallet. App detection at operating-system level is the platform's domain. | Partly |
| TR35 | An attacker can obtain a knowledge factor used for user authenticating to the WSCA. | R6 | Wallet provider | User verification is by the device's biometrics or passcode (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); the attempt limit is in the platform; no certified WSCA. | Partly |
| TR36 | The electronic attestation of attributes about a person that is presented in multiple transactions with a relying party, or across different relying parties, unintentionally allows to link multiple transactions to the relevant person. | R6 | Wallet provider, Issuer | Ten copies issued in a batch (RB-AP-09), a separate copy per verifier (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL5, RB-WP-05), a pseudonym per site (ADR-0031/PS1), zero-knowledge proofs for the identity credential (ADR-0032). The same copy for the same verifier is by design; residual risk FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L3. | Partly |
| TR37 | A public attestation/relying party revocation list can contain information about the user's usage of their attestation (e.g. location, IP address ...). | R6 | Issuer, Operator | Status lists are published at a fixed interval (SPEC-CRED-0003/S5), verifiers prefetch in bulk (S12), positions are random (S7); IP addresses are not logged (RB-GEN-05). | Met |
| TR38 | Not being able to prove user's consent for shared attributes, relying parties can affect the integrity of logs. | R6 | Verifier, Wallet provider | The presentation is bound to the person's key by the KB-JWT or the device signature; the verifier's audit record is kept for rejections too (SPEC-API-0001/AP9). The wallet log has no integrity protection. | Partly |
| TR39 | An attacker can unlawfully trace wallet users using unique/traceable identifiers. | R6 / R14 | Wallet provider, Verifier | No global identifier (SPEC-ID-0002/XC4, RB-H-06); a pseudonym per site (ADR-0031/PS1); sign-in policies do not ask for the national number (PS4); the WIA sub is shared (ADR-0034/CI6). If the national number is disclosed the person can be traced. | Partly |
| TR40 | A relying party that consists of multiple units/entities that each have a different scope of what they are allowed to request/process, can request and process data for which they do not have lawful grounds for. | R6 / R9 | Verifier, Operator | Registration with a scope (RB-REG-08), one registration certificate per intended use (RB-RP-14), scope check (SPEC-API-0001/AP6), intermediary relation in both records (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV14). One access certificate per verifier; the EU split into relying party instances is not there. | Partly |
| TR41 | An attacker can subvert the integrity and authenticity checks by the wallet of PIDs to always return success. | R7 | Wallet provider, Verifier | The acceptance decision is not in the wallet but in the verifier's own pipeline (RB-RP-03); subverting the wallet's check does not get a forged credential accepted. | Met |
| TR42 | An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify the integrity and authenticity of requested attributes to always return success. | R7 | Wallet provider, Verifier | The verifier checks the signature, digests and sd_hash itself (RB-RP-03, SPEC-CRED-0002/C9, C10). | Met |
| TR43 | An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify all requested attributes belonging to the same user to always return success. | R7 | Wallet provider, Verifier | The verifier checks the holder binding of each credential in the same response separately against the same aud and nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV7, PV10, PV11); there is no cryptographic link showing that the credentials belong to the same wallet unit (see TR86). | Partly |
| TR44 | An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify the PID is valid and issued by a trusted PID provider to always return success. | R7 | Wallet provider, Verifier | The verifier itself asks the signed list whether the institution was acceptable at iat and authorised for the type (RB-RP-03, SPEC-API-0001/AP8). | Met |
| TR45 | An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify that a QEAA is valid and issued by a qualified TSP, who is registered to issue the QEAA, to always return success. | R7 | Verifier | There is no qualified trust service provider in the network; the qualified class is not recorded without an independent conformity assessment (ADR-0022/IDC1). | Not applicable |
| TR46 | An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify whether the PID has been revoked by the PID provider to always return success. | R7 | Wallet provider, Verifier | The verifier checks the status itself (SPEC-CRED-0003); a credential of a status-list type without a status entry is rejected (ADR-0056/MR8). | Met |
| TR47 | An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify whether the (Q)EAA has been revoked by the (Q)EAA provider to always return success. | R7 | Wallet provider, Verifier | Same as TR46: the verifier checks revocation itself (SPEC-CRED-0003, ADR-0056/MR8). | Met |
| TR48 | An attacker can modify the content of backup and recovery data that should be exclusively under the user's control. | R7 / R8 | Wallet provider | There is no wallet backup (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL2, RB-WP-07); the migration file is password-encrypted and holds no credential values or keys (ADR-0027/LX2, ADR-0078). | Not applicable |
| TR49 | An attacker can modify the transaction history for a given wallet instance from the activity logs. | R7 / R8 | Wallet provider | The log is kept on the device; it has no integrity protection such as a signature or a hash chain. | Open |
| TR50 | An attacker can eavesdrop during the connection from the wallet to relying parties. | R5 / R6 | Verifier, Wallet provider | TLS and encrypted response (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3, RB-RP-02); session encryption in proximity. | Met |
| TR51 | An attacker can convince a user to share personal data (i.e. PID, EAA-s, pseudonyms, electronic signatures, logs and other data) with the attacker or with a third party that the user did not intend to do so. | R5 / R6 | Wallet provider | Mandatory registration certificate (RB-WP-19), the registered name (RB-WP-13), field-by-field consent and the over-asking warning (RB-WP-04); no presentation to a suspended or unregistered verifier. Persuasion cannot be ruled out entirely. | Partly |
| TR52 | An attacker can read the transaction history for a given wallet instance from the activity logs. | R5 / R6 | Wallet provider | The log stays on the device and never goes to a server (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL4, SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV8); export is encrypted (ADR-0027/LX1). | Partly |
| TR53 | An attacker can export or extract cryptographic key material outside of the WSCD. | R5 / R6 / R9 | Wallet provider | Keys are generated in the secure area and never leave it (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1, RB-WP-01); the key attestation states the storage level truthfully (ADR-0025/WIA3). No certified WSCD (W3). | Partly |
| TR54 | An attacker can read the content of backup and recovery data that should be exclusively under the user's control. | R5 / R6 | Wallet provider | There is no wallet backup (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL2); the migration file is password-encrypted (ADR-0027/LX1). | Not applicable |
| TR55 | An attacker can bypass the user authentication method to use a pseudonym generated by a wallet unit. | R4 | Wallet provider | A pseudonym presentation is signed with the pseudonym key and carries a non-revoked unit attestation (ADR-0031/PS5); user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11). | Partly |
| TR56 | An attacker can propose an application that mimics a specific legitimate wallet to users. | R4 | Wallet provider, Issuer | The issuer accepts only a WIA signed by a listed provider (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR11); the "Listed on Tamga Network" indicator comes from the signed list (ADR-0049/LI1–LI3). A person installing a lookalike app cannot be prevented. | Partly |
| TR57 | An attacker can export wallet data, including PID, (Q)EAAs or logs. | R4 | Wallet provider | Export only when the person starts it, password-encrypted; the file holds no credential values, copies or keys (ADR-0027/LX1, LX2). | Partly |
| TR58 | An attacker can export cryptographic binding material. | R4 | Wallet provider | Keys never leave the secure area (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1); no certified WSCD. | Partly |
| TR59 | An attacker can take over identities through the cryptographic keys of the wallet. | R4 | Wallet provider | Key use is bound to user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1, WL11); when the unit is revoked its WIA entries are revoked (ADR-0025/WIA2). | Partly |
| TR60 | An attacker can duplicate another user's personal wallet unit on their personal device and use it. | R4 / R1 | Wallet provider | Keys are bound to the device and cannot be moved (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1, WL2); device attestation is mandatory at W3 and optional at W2 (RB-WP-17). | Partly |
| TR61 | Authorities of another state can ask the user to show and/or share all the wallet data in a situation of proximity, such as when crossing the border of that state. | R4 / R14 | Wallet provider | Field-by-field consent for every presentation (RB-H-02) and selective disclosure; reader registration and gate groups in proximity (ADR-0069). Technical measures against legal compulsion are limited. | Partly |
| TR62 | Users cannot transfer their transaction logs after failure of a user device, resulting in a loss of traceability of previous transactions on the new wallet. | R11 | Wallet provider | The log moves with the person's encrypted migration file while the device works (ADR-0078, ADR-0027/LX1); there is no transfer path from a failed device. | Partly |
| TR63 | Users cannot recover their transaction logs after failure of a user device, resulting in a loss of traceability on the new wallet. | R11 | Wallet provider | There is deliberately no server-side backup (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL2, WL4); the log is lost on failure. | Open |
| TR64 | Relying parties can have difficulties proving consent for remote electronic signatures. | R11 | Verifier | The network has no electronic-signature function today. | Not applicable |
| TR65 | An attacker can flood the connection(s) with requests during the connection to relying parties. | R13 | Verifier | Request limits in the reference verifier; memory limits on request_uri branches (ADR-0067/RQ5). No load testing yet. | Partly |
| TR66 | An attacker can flood a status provisioning service with connections to relying parties. | R13 | Issuer, Operator | Status lists are published as static files through a content delivery network; verifiers do not fetch per verification but prefetch in bulk (SPEC-CRED-0003/S12). No load testing yet. | Partly |
| TR67 | An attacker can make the attribute presentation appearing as contested/denied, despite the attribute presentation stating its validity. | R13 | Verifier | The result is three-valued; "indeterminate" is not treated as rejected (SPEC-API-0001/AP2, RB-RP-05) and is shown separately to the person (SPEC-CRED-0003/S14); the result lists the steps performed and skipped. | Partly |
| TR68 | An attacker can revoke a PID without justified reason. | R13 | Identity service | Revocation conditions are in the policy (FW-POL-0001); only the issuer revokes; the person can object (RB-H-05). Protecting the status key is the issuer's job. | Partly |
| TR69 | An attacker can revoke a PID without user consent. | R13 | Identity service | Same as TR68; the paths for revocation at the person's request are in the policy (FW-POL-0001). | Partly |
| TR70 | An attacker can revoke a (Q)EAA without justified reason. | R13 | Issuer | Revocation conditions are in the common policy; an institution can only add conditions, not narrow them (ADR-0047/WR2); the status key is separate from the signing key (SPEC-CRED-0003/S11). | Partly |
| TR71 | An attacker can revoke a (Q)EAA without user consent. | R13 | Issuer | Same as TR70 (FW-POL-0001). | Partly |
| TR72 | An attacker can trigger multiple identification requests without them being recognised as intentional orphan requests. | R13 | Verifier, Wallet provider | The request object has a lifetime (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV13), nonce is single use (PV10), branches are memory-bounded (ADR-0067/RQ5); the wallet rejects a request without a registration certificate without asking the person (RB-WP-19). | Partly |
| TR73 | An attacker can send multiple requests with no follow-up transaction. | R13 | Verifier | Same as TR72; request limits in the reference verifier. | Partly |
| TR74 | An attacker can allow a relying party to request identification without a matching identification (response) and full control. | R13 | Verifier | Every request is signed and bound to a registered verifier (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV6, RB-RP-01); a response closes only its own branch (ADR-0067/RQ2). | Partly |
| TR75 | An attacker can send a response to a request after its timeout, or similar situations leading to a service disruption. | R13 | Verifier | The request object has a lifetime (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV13), nonce is single use (PV10); a response that cannot be decrypted does not touch the presentation and does not count as an attempt (ADR-0067/RQ4). | Met |
| TR76 | A relying party can send multiple invalid requests. | R13 | Verifier, Wallet provider | The wallet rejects an unsigned request or one without a registration certificate without asking the person (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV6, RB-WP-19); the enforcement ladder for an abusing verifier (RB-ENF-02). | Partly |
| TR77 | An attacker can send multiple invalid requests to a wallet provider. | R13 | Wallet provider | No network rule; the provider's operational measure. Unit requests are signed with the unit key (ADR-0025). | Partly |
| TR78 | An attacker can make a Member State unable to revoke an untrusted PID provider from the trusted PID provider trusted list. | R13 | Operator | The list is re-signed at least every 90 days and changes are published quickly (RB-OP-03); a stale list yields "indeterminate" (RB-GEN-03). The list signature rests with a single operator (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L1). | Partly |
| TR79 | An attacker can prevent suspension or revocation of a wallet. | R13 | Wallet provider, Identity service | Unit revocation without the phone and without an account (ADR-0047/WR3); a WIA lives less than 24 hours (ADR-0025/WIA1); the identity service revokes its credentials on a revoked unit within 24 hours (ADR-0047/WR1). | Met |
| TR80 | An attacker can block transactions by relying parties, users and/or PID provider. | R13 | Operator, Verifier | Offline presentation in proximity; verifiers prefetch lists (RB-RP-06); "indeterminate" on a stale source (RB-GEN-03). No outage testing yet. | Partly |
| TR81 | An attacker can disable or make a WSCD unavailable. | R13 | Wallet provider | The platform's secure area; after device loss or failure the credentials are issued again (RB-H-04). | Partly |
| TR82 | An attacker can make the PID provider unable to revoke or suspend PIDs. | R13 / R9 | Identity service | The status list is published at a fixed interval even without changes; on restart without a published token it is published at once (SPEC-CRED-0003/S5, S6); when the token expires the verifier returns "indeterminate". | Partly |
| TR83 | A relying party can derive the user's identity data beyond data shared with them. | R14 | Verifier | Scope check (SPEC-API-0001/AP6), data-minimisation review (RB-REG-08), selective disclosure and age fields (ADR-0064/YE2). | Partly |
| TR84 | A group of colluding relying parties or PID providers can derive the user's identity data beyond data known to them. | R14 | Verifier, Issuer | A separate copy and pseudonym per verifier; zero-knowledge proofs for the identity credential (ADR-0032). Linkage remains possible if credentials of the same issuer are combined (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L3). | Partly |
| TR85 | An attacker can track and trace a user by using person identification data of the user where identification of the user is not required. | R14 | Verifier | Sign-in policies do not ask for the national number (ADR-0031/PS4); a pseudonym per site (RB-RP-13); scope check (SPEC-API-0001/AP6). | Partly |
| TR86 | An attacker can combine a 'forged' presentation of (Q)EAA combinations. | R10 | Verifier | The holder binding of each credential in the same response is checked separately against the same aud and nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV7, PV10, PV11); if two people's wallets cooperate, there is no cryptographic link showing that the credentials belong to the same wallet unit. The EU discussion is ongoing. | Partly |
| TR87 | An attacker can activate/take over the wallet remotely (e.g., a bank app embedding an authentication or attestation request) without the explicit consent or sole control of the user, in situations where the user is unaware of (e.g., asleep), or cannot see the relying party. | R10 | Wallet provider | Every presentation needs user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); the consent screen shows the verifier's registered name (RB-WP-13). | Partly |
| TR88 | Attackers can make changes to a request's metadata (service name, usages, etc.). | R10 | Verifier, Wallet provider | The request object is signed (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV6); the registration certificate is signed and bound to the access certificate (ADR-0026/WRC4). | Met |
| TR89 | Attackers can make changes to response information (service state, nonce, etc.). | R10 | Verifier | The response is encrypted (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3); the KB-JWT signs nonce and aud (PV7), sd_hash binds the presented set (SPEC-CRED-0002/C9). | Met |
| TR90 | Attackers can make changes to a request's attribute information (over asking, etc.). | R10 | Verifier, Wallet provider | The request is signed; the wallet compares what is asked with the registered scope and warns on over-asking (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL8); scope check at the verifier (SPEC-API-0001/AP6). | Met |
| TR91 | A relying party can replay elements from a previous session in another session. | R10 | Verifier | nonce is single use (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV10); every fetch is a fresh branch (PV15); KB-JWT iat window (SPEC-CRED-0002/C17). | Met |
| TR92 | An attacker can replace or modify the PID during its transfer from the PID provider to the wallet unit. | R10 | Identity service, Wallet provider | The credential is signed and travels over TLS; the access token is DPoP-bound (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR17); on receipt the wallet checks the signature and the binding to its own key. | Met |
| TR93 | An attacker can replace or modify the PID during its transfer from the wallet unit to the online relying party. | R10 | Verifier | Credential signature, KB-JWT and encrypted response (SPEC-CRED-0002/C8, SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3). | Met |
| TR94 | An attacker can replace or modify the PID during its transfer from the wallet unit to the offline relying party. | R10 | Verifier | In mdoc the issuer's signature and a session-bound device signature (ADR-0013/MD3, SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV11); session encryption in proximity. | Met |
| TR95 | An attacker can issue a PID without the user's consent. | R9 | Identity service | Information and explicit consent before the identity credential (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP11); the person's final confirmation in the wallet that started the flow (ADR-0080/VL1); the "your credential was added to a wallet" notice (RB-AP-15). | Met |
| TR96 | An attacker can use revoked or invalid embedded disclosure policies, possibly without the relying parties' knowledge. | R9 | Issuer, Wallet provider | The policy lives only in signed metadata (ADR-0046/EP1); credentials of a configuration whose policy changes are revoked (EP4); the wallet evaluates the policy offline (EP2). | Met |
| TR97 | An attacker can trick the wallet into verifying wrong electronic signatures. | R9 | Wallet provider | The network has no electronic-signature function today. | Not applicable |
| TR98 | An attacker can use the wallet outside of the user's control. | R9 | Wallet provider | User verification for every presentation (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); unit revocation without the phone (ADR-0047/WR3). | Partly |
| TR99 | An attacker can convince a user to authenticate and approve transactions with an attacker or unauthorised third party. | R9 | Wallet provider | Mandatory registration certificate (RB-WP-19), the registered name (RB-WP-13); no presentation to a suspended or revoked verifier. Persuasion cannot be ruled out entirely. | Partly |
| TR100 | An attacker can make a user electronically sign without presenting the content to the user or after presenting wrong content. | R9 | Wallet provider | The network has no electronic-signature function today. | Not applicable |
| TR101 | An attacker can bypass access control of the user's account with the wallet provider. | R9 | Wallet provider | The wallet provider requires no user account (ADR-0047/WR3); the unit record holds no personal data (ADR-0025/WIA2). | Not applicable |
| TR102 | An attacker can impersonate relying parties during the connection to relying parties. | R9 / R6 | Verifier, Wallet provider | The client identifier comes from the access certificate and must match the leaf (ADR-0034/CI1, CI2); mandatory registration certificate (ADR-0056/MR5); signed request (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV6). | Met |
| TR103 | The user behind the relying party – browser connection can be different from the user behind the relying party – wallet connection. | R9 / R6 / R4 | Verifier | On the Digital Credentials API path the response is bound to the page origin (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV7); on the cross-device (QR) path there is no separate link between the browser session and the wallet. | Partly |
| TR104 | An attacker can convince the user to revoke the user's wallet without reason. | R9 / R13 | Wallet provider | Revocation is done with the person's closing code or from inside the wallet (ADR-0047/WR3); the person can learn of a revocation outside the wallet (WR4). Persuasion cannot be ruled out entirely. | Partly |
| TR105 | An attacker can perform man-in-the-middle attacks. | R9 / R6 / R14 | Verifier, Wallet provider | TLS, signed request, encrypted response (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3, PV6); session encryption in proximity; the access certificate is bound to the client identifier (ADR-0034/CI2). | Met |
| TR106 | An attacker can present invalid or revoked attributes from a wallet that does not regularly connect to the network. | various | Verifier | The verifier checks status and validity itself (SPEC-CRED-0003); zero-knowledge presentation only with copies valid for at most 24 hours (ADR-0044/ZC1). | Met |
| TR107 | An attacker can steal information from a user by spoofing a wallet. | various | Wallet provider | The issuer accepts only a listed provider's WIA (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR11); the "listed" indicator (ADR-0049/LI1–LI3). A person entering data into a fake app cannot be prevented. | Partly |
| TR108 | An attacker can impersonate the user by replaying/imitating a data request (e.g., authentication), which would appear as valid. | various | Verifier | Single-use nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV10), KB-JWT aud and iat window (PV7, SPEC-CRED-0002/C17). | Met |
| TR109 | An attacker can replay an embedded disclosure policy towards a user, to imitate an approved request. | various | Wallet provider | The policy is stored with the credential from signed metadata (ADR-0046/EP2); the policy never replaces the person's consent, every presentation needs approval (EP3). | Partly |
| TR110 | An attacker can exploit the lack of information of wallet users, or undue delays, after a security breach or compromise. | various | Operator, Wallet provider | Incident notification deadlines (RB-GEN-09), a way for the person to learn of a unit revocation outside the wallet (ADR-0047/WR4), a quarterly transparency report (RB-OP-12). The only direct warning channel to the person is the wallet's own notifications. | Partly |
| TR111 | An attacker can modify a previously installed legitimate wallet instance to add malicious features. | various | Wallet provider | Device attestation mandatory at W3 (RB-WP-17); per-version revocation of wallet attestations when a flaw is found (RB-WP-11). | Partly |
| TR112 | An attacker can modify a legitimate wallet instance and propose it to users as a legitimate one. | various | Wallet provider | Same as TR111; the issuer accepts only a listed provider's WIA (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR11). | Partly |
| TR113 | An attacker can defeat the user authentication mechanism itself to bypass the authentication of the wallet user. | various | Wallet provider | User verification uses the platform's biometrics or passcode (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); no certification. | Partly |
| TR114 | An attacker can introduce malicious code or backdoors into the wallet code during its deployment to the user device. | various | Wallet provider | App store signing; release provenance for packages (RB-GEN-07). | Partly |
| TR115 | An attacker can introduce malicious code or backdoors into the wallet code during its development. | various | Wallet provider | Open-source core, release provenance (RB-GEN-07), mandatory pre-release tests (RB-ENF-01); no independent code audit. | Partly |
| TR116 | An attacker can tamper with the generation of random numbers to reduce their entropy sufficiently to enable attacks. | various | Wallet provider, Issuer | The platform's cryptographic generator; salt ≥ 128 bits (SPEC-CRED-0002/C3); random status position (SPEC-CRED-0003/S7). | Partly |
| TR117 | An attacker can tamper with user devices in the supply chain to include code or configurations that do not meet the conditions of use of the wallet. | various | Wallet provider | Device attestation mandatory at W3, optional at W2 (RB-WP-17). | Partly |
| TR118 | An attacker can activate a wallet unit while using a spoofed WSCD controlled by the attackers. | various | Wallet provider | The key attestation states the storage level truthfully (ADR-0025/WIA3); a W3 claim only for a unit with verified device attestation (ADR-0047/WR5). | Partly |
| TR119 | An attacker can read information sent to the WSCA and/or the WSCD. | various | Wallet provider | The WSCA and WSCD are the platform's secure area; there is no separate certified component (FW-ARF-0001 §7.1). | Partly |
| TR120 | An attacker can send arbitrary information to the WSCA. | various | Wallet provider | Same as TR119. | Partly |
| TR121 | An attacker can steal information by intercepting the exchanges between the WSCA and the WSCD. | various | Wallet provider | Same as TR119. | Partly |
| TR122 | An attacker can send arbitrary information to the WSCD. | various | Wallet provider | Same as TR119. | Partly |
| TR123 | An attacker can send information to the WSCD, circumnavigating the WSCA. | various | Wallet provider | Same as TR119. | Partly |
| TR124 | An attacker can use phishing to get users to a fake wallet and PID management web application. | various | Identity service, Wallet provider | Identity proofing only in a flow the wallet starts, with the final confirmation in that wallet (ADR-0080/VL1, VL2); a warning before proofing (VL3). Entering data into a fake page cannot be prevented. | Partly |
| TR125 | An attacker can replace a wallet's keys with other keys to create messages to be used in another attack. | various | Wallet provider, Issuer | Before issuance the key attestation shows the keys are in secure hardware (RB-AP-10); each copy is bound to the attested key (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR6). | Partly |
| TR126 | An attacker can modify or destroy a wallet's keys, making some functions of the wallet unusable. | various | Wallet provider | Credentials are issued again (RB-H-04); key deletion follows a fixed order (record first, then key). | Partly |
| TR127 | An attacker can control a malware to access data stored in the wallet. | various | Wallet provider | Keys in the secure area (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1); data in the platform's app sandbox; device attestation. | Partly |
| TR128 | An attacker can access evidence generated in the wallet. | various | Wallet provider | The log stays on the device and leaves only in an encrypted export (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL4). | Partly |
| TR129 | Wallet providers can access objects in the wallet. | various | Wallet provider | The provider never sees credential values; the unit record holds no personal data (ADR-0025/WIA2); the provider holds no recovery key (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL10) and takes no backup (WL2). | Met |
| TR130 | Wallet providers can access evidence generated in the wallet. | various | Wallet provider | The presentation log never goes to a server (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL4, SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV8). | Met |
| TR131 | An attacker can steal an unlocked wallet device. | various | Wallet provider | User verification again for every presentation (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); unit revocation without the phone (ADR-0047/WR3). | Partly |
| TR132 | An attacker can manipulate the system to prevent certain events from being logged. | various | Wallet provider | Logging is done in the wallet core; there is no integrity protection showing that the log is complete. | Open |
| TR133 | An attacker can intercept communication between the wallet instance and the WSCA, or replay/imitate a user (e.g. by hijacking authentication mechanism). | various | Wallet provider | Key use is bound to the platform's user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1, WL11); no separate certified WSCA. | Partly |
7. Open topics
- Same person in a multi-credential presentation (TR20, TR43, TR86): the verifier checks the holder binding of each credential in the same response separately; there is no cryptographic link showing that the credentials belong to the same wallet unit. The topic is under discussion in the EU as well.
- Integrity of the wallet log (TR38, TR49, TR132): the log stays on the device but is not protected against modification or omission.
- Certification and independent audit: there is no certified secure hardware (W3), no independent code audit and no penetration test; that is why most wallet-side measures are "Partly".
- Single operator (TR4, TR17, TR78): the list signature rests with a single operator; the key ceremony and hardware security module are pending (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L1).
Status
Active — version 1.0.0 (16 November 2026). A self-assessment; updated in the same piece of work whenever a risk or a measure changes.