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Risk Register ​

Document FW-RISK-0001 · Version 1.0.0 · Status Active · Updated 2026-11-16 · Licence CC BY 4.0 Official English translation of the Turkish source text; in case of conflict the Turkish text prevails.

This document shows, for every risk and threat in the EU wallet risk register, Tamga's measure and its status; it is for regulators, states, auditors and participants.

Self-assessment. This register is Tamga's own assessment; it is not an independent audit, a conformity assessment or a certificate. "Met" is used only for measures backed by a binding rule and present in the reference implementation.

When to read it. First the security section of the main document (FW-ARF-0001 §7) and the risk approach of the Trust Framework (FW-TF-0001 §1.5). The rules behind the measures are in the Tamga Rulebook (FW-RB-0001) and in the cited specifications and decisions.

1. Source and method ​

The EU collects the risks that every wallet architecture must address in a common risk register: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2981, Annex I (Annex 6 of the EU ARF). It has four sections: high-level risks (R1–R14), system-related risks (SR1–SR3), technical threats (TT1–TT5 with subcategories) and direct threat scenarios (TR1–TR133). This document follows the same skeleton; codes and titles are those of the regulation.

Tamga Network does not operate a wallet (ADR-0042); for wallet-side rows the measure is the set of rules the Tamga Rulebook places on listed wallet providersThe organisation that offers a wallet, registers its wallet units and signs wallet and key attestations. Each wallet runs its own provider; the network does not run one, it lists them in the trusted list. (RB-WP) and the open-source Tamga wallet core.

ColumnMeaning
WhoThe role responsible for the measure: operator (the network's provisional operator), identity service (Tamga's provisional identity credential service; not a PID), issuer, verifier, wallet provider
Measure in TamgaA short description and the source of the rule (DOC-ID/CODE or a Tamga Rulebook rule code)
StatusMet: binding rule and present in the reference implementation · Partly: a measure exists but is incomplete, not yet verified on phones or not certified · Open: no measure · Not applicable: the function the threat relies on does not exist in Tamga

Threats about the PID were read as applying to Tamga's provisional identity credential (Tamga issues no PID — SPEC-TRUST-0001/TL8).

2. Counts ​

SectionMetPartlyOpenNot applicable
High-level risks (14)01400
System-related risks (3)0300
Technical threat subcategories (18)21600
Threat scenarios (133)328939

No high-level risk is counted as fully met: each has at least one scenario that is partly met or open. Open scenarios: TR49, TR63, TR132 (integrity of the wallet log and loss of the log on device failure). Not applicable: TR7, TR11, TR45, TR48, TR54, TR64, TR97, TR100, TR101 (paths that do not exist in Tamga: proofing with a qualified certificate or eID means, electronic signatures, qualified trust services, wallet backup, user accounts).

3. High-level risks ​

CodeRiskMain measures in TamgaStatus
R1Creation or use of an existing electronic identityThe identity credential is issued only after licensed remote identity proofing and the person's final confirmation in the wallet that started the flow; copies are bound to keys the wallet proves. No independent audit.Partly
R2Creation or use of a fake electronic identityTamga issues no PID; the identity service is registered in the trusted list with a credential-type authorisation; an unauthorised type is rejected in verification. The list signature rests with a single operator today.Partly
R3Creation or use of fake attributesEvery credential is signed, the signer is in the trusted list and the type authorisation cannot be skipped; holder binding is mandatory. Fabrication inside an institution is under the institution's own controls.Partly
R4Identity theftKeys in the device's secure area, every presentation with user verification; unit revocation without the phone. No certified secure hardware (W3).Partly
R5Data theftNo personal data in shared records; responses are encrypted; the log stays on the device and leaves only in the person's encrypted export; no wallet backup.Partly
R6Data disclosureSelective disclosure, field-by-field consent, scope check, mandatory registration certificate; linkage remains possible if credentials of the same issuer are combined (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L3).Partly
R7Data manipulationCredentials are signed; the acceptance decision is in the verifier's own pipeline. The wallet log has no integrity protection.Partly
R8Data lossThere is deliberately no wallet backup; credentials are issued again on a new device, the log moves only with the migration file.Partly
R9Unauthorised transactionSigned request, registration certificate, single-use nonce, user verification for every presentation; phishing cannot be ruled out entirely.Partly
R10Transaction manipulationRequest, response and credential are signed and encrypted; open: proof that the credentials of a multi-credential presentation belong to the same person (TR86).Partly
R11RepudiationKB-JWT and the device signature evidence the presentation; the verifier's audit record is kept for rejections too. The log is lost if the device fails.Partly
R12Transaction data disclosureThe presentation log stays on the device; verifier results and logs carry no field values and no status-list position; IP addresses are not logged.Partly
R13Service disruptionA stale or unreachable trust source yields "indeterminate", never acceptance; status lists are static and fetched in bulk; no load or outage testing yet.Partly
R14SurveillanceNo global identifier; a copy per verifier, a pseudonym per site, zero-knowledge proofs; status lists at a fixed interval and in bulk.Partly

Under the regulation these risks are the system-level result of several threats; they are not mapped to threat scenarios.

CodeRiskMain measures in TamgaStatus
SR1Wholesale surveillanceNo central service sees transactions: trusted lists and status lists are fetched in bulk, the presentation log stays on the device, shared records hold no personal data. Against colluding verifiers, zero-knowledge proofs exist only for the identity credential.Partly
SR2Reputational damageIncident notification deadlines, a public change log and a quarterly transparency report; no independent audit or certification.Partly
SR3Legal non-complianceThe network is not bound by EU law but follows the EU model; personal-data rules are protected by binding rules; the legal review of the framework is due before the pilot.Partly

5. Technical threats ​

Technical threats are not tied to a single risk; they are means for many attacks.

CodeThreatMeasure in TamgaStatus
TT1 1.1TheftUser verification for every presentation; unit revocation without the phone (RB-WP-15).Partly
TT1 1.2Information leakageData on the device; platform encrypted storage; values are not logged (RB-GEN-06).Partly
TT1 1.3TamperingDevice attestation and per-version revocation of wallet attestations (RB-WP-11, RB-WP-17).Partly
TT2 2.1Errors made when managing an IT systemMandatory pre-release tests (RB-ENF-01), deviation register (RB-ENF-04); operating policies.Partly
TT2 2.2Application-level errors or usage errors"Invalid" and "indeterminate" are shown differently (RB-WP-12); three-valued result (RB-RP-05).Partly
TT2 2.3Development-time errors and system misconfigurationsOpen conformance vectors, secure defaults (ADR-0056), open source; no independent code audit.Partly
TT3 3.1Erroneous use or configuration of wallet componentsRelease provenance for packages (RB-GEN-07); stop on an unknown list format (RB-GEN-04).Partly
TT4 4.1Failure or dysfunction of equipment, devices or systems"Indeterminate" on a stale source (RB-GEN-03); credentials are issued again after a device failure (RB-H-04).Partly
TT4 4.2Loss of resourcesStatic publication of lists and status lists; a single operator (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L1).Partly
TT4 4.3Loss of support servicesVerifiers prefetch lists in bulk (RB-RP-06); offline presentation in proximity.Partly
TT5 5.1Interception of informationTLS, encrypted response (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3), session encryption in proximity.Met
TT5 5.2Phishing and spoofingMandatory registration certificate (RB-WP-19), the registered name shown (RB-WP-13), final confirmation against link relay (ADR-0080/VL1).Partly
TT5 5.3Replay of messagesSingle-use nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV10), KB-JWT iat window (SPEC-CRED-0002/C17), single-use c_nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR4).Met
TT5 5.4Brute-force attackThree attempts for the transaction code (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR12), salt ≥ 128 bits (SPEC-CRED-0002/C3); request limits on services.Partly
TT5 5.5Software vulnerabilitiesOpen source, a responsible disclosure channel, per-version revocation (RB-WP-11); no independent audit.Partly
TT5 5.6Supply chain attacksRelease provenance for packages (RB-GEN-07); dependency review.Partly
TT5 5.7MalwareKeys in the secure area (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1); device attestation.Partly
TT5 5.8Random number predictionThe platform's cryptographic generator; random status position (SPEC-CRED-0003/S7).Partly

6. Threat scenarios ​

The "Related risk" column is the mapping in the regulation; TR106–TR133 are marked there as "effect on various risks".

CodeThreat scenarioRelated riskWhoMeasure in TamgaStatus
TR1An attacker can revoke pseudonyms without justified reason.R2Identity service, Wallet providerSite pseudonyms are derived on the device from a seed; there is no central pseudonym revocation list; the seed is not stored by the identity service (ADR-0031/PS2).Met
TR2An attacker can issue fabricated electronic identities that do not exist.R2Identity serviceThe identity credential is not issued before the type's level is met (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP2, RB-AP-11); no independent audit.Partly
TR3An attacker can start to issue unauthorised PIDs.R2OperatorTamga issues no PID (SPEC-TRUST-0001/TL8); type authorisation is an allow-list, closed by default (RB-REG-04), and cannot be skipped in verification (SPEC-API-0001/AP8).Met
TR4An attacker can get an administrator to enter a wrong PID provider into the PID provider trusted list.R2OperatorEntry into the list follows the onboarding review (FW-ONB-0001); every change is in the public change log (RB-OP-07). The list is signed by a single operator; the key ceremony and hardware security module are pending (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L1).Partly
TR5An attacker can bypass the remote identity proofing service.R1 / R2Identity serviceDocument, liveness and face checks with a licensed provider; the provider's decision is confirmed through the signed notification and the decision query (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP5); final confirmation against link relay (ADR-0080/VL1–VL3).Partly
TR6An attacker can bypass the physical identity proofing service.R1 / R2Identity serviceThe in-person path is defined at level T2 in the identity rulebook (FW-RB-0003); the in-person procedure itself is not written down yet.Partly
TR7An attacker can bypass the identity proofing services related to the use of a remote (qualified) certificate.R1 / R2Identity serviceThis path is not offered; level T3, which rests on a qualified signature, is not issued today (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP7).Not applicable
TR8An attacker can get access to a wallet that is not bound to a person.R1 / R2Wallet providerEvery presentation needs user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11, RB-WP-03); credentials are issued after the person's identity proofing. Binding the wallet to the person rests on the device's user verification.Partly
TR9An attacker can defeat technical and procedural controls to create wrong PIDs.R1 / R2Identity serviceIssuance stops for a value with no entry in the mapping table (RB-AP-13); the issuer's audit record; no independent audit.Partly
TR10An attacker can activate a new wallet on an invalid WSCD.R1 / R2Wallet providerSoftware-key wallets are not supported (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL3); the key attestation states the storage level truthfully (ADR-0025/WIA3); a W3 claim requires device attestation (RB-WP-17). No certified WSCD.Partly
TR11An attacker can bypass the identity proofing service related to the use of existing eID means.R1 / R2Identity serviceThere is no proofing path through eID means; reading the identity document chip is switched off (ADR-0083/CV7).Not applicable
TR12An attacker can circumvent the verification by the PID provider that the wallet is controlled by the user and have a PID issued into a compromised wallet under the attacker's control.R1 / R4 / R9Identity service, Wallet providerWIA and key attestation are checked before issuance (RB-AP-10, SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR11, PR19); the person confirms the masked summary in the wallet that started the flow (ADR-0080/VL1). Device attestation is optional at W2.Partly
TR13An attacker can get a valid PID into an invalid wallet unit.R1 / R4 / R9Identity service, Wallet providerA WIA lives less than 24 hours and is new for every transaction (ADR-0025/WIA1); no credential is issued against a revoked WIA or key attestation (ADR-0025/WIA4, SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR19).Met
TR14A PID provider can issue fabricated identities where the identity is related to an existing person.R1 / R4 / R9Identity serviceIdentity data comes from the provider's confirmed decision (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP5); the person gets a "your credential was added to a wallet" notice (RB-AP-15). No independent audit against insider misuse; the network rests on a single operator (RB-GEN-10).Partly
TR15An attacker can link a PID with the wrong wallet because the PID provider is not able to link the PID to the correct wallet.R1 / R4 / R9Identity serviceEach copy is bound to a separate key whose possession the wallet proves (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR6); the final confirmation goes only to the wallet that started the flow, bound to its key (ADR-0080/VL2).Met
TR16An attacker can make the user approving the activation of a new wallet unit/instance under the attacker's control – with subsequent control of attestations as well.R1 / R2 / R4 / R9Wallet providerA warning before proofing starts: which wallet this proofing is for (ADR-0080/VL3); the "your credential was added to a wallet" notice and objection (RB-AP-15, RB-H-05); unit revocation without the phone (ADR-0047/WR3).Partly
TR17An attacker can issue a PID of another state to access data / digital assets of targeted citizens.R1 / R4 / R9OperatorAn institution chains only to its own state's root certificate (SPEC-ID-0002/XC1, RB-REG-03); a national list is signed by that state's key (SPEC-TRUST-0001/TL7) — today the provisional operator signs all lists; the recognition check is at the verifier (RB-RP-03).Partly
TR18An attacker can defeat technical and procedural controls to create fake (Q)EAAs.R3IssuerThe signing key stays with the institution (ADR-0057/RS1, RB-AP-02); data is read from the authentic source at signing time (ADR-0020/AS1); no credential for a record without a mapping (RB-AS-02). The institution's internal controls are its own.Partly
TR19An attacker can present (Q)EAAs that are not validly issued to them.R3VerifierKB-JWT is mandatory without exception (SPEC-CRED-0002/C8), a credential without cnf is rejected (C16); in mdoc the device signature is bound to the session (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV11); the key never leaves the secure area (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1).Met
TR20An attacker can attack the cryptographic linking mechanism of the wallet between the PID and a (Q)EAA that should not be issued to them.R3Issuer, VerifierAn institution credential is issued through an identity-bound offer (ADR-0020/AS2) or a presentation of the identity credential (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR14); but the issued credential is not cryptographically bound to the identity credential's key (each copy has its own key, PR6). That the credentials of one presentation come from the same wallet rests on the verifier's same-response check (see TR86).Partly
TR21An attacker can use a (Q)EAA in a wallet, although the physical counterpart of the (Q)EAA is expired or invalid.R3Issuerexp in the credential and the institution's status list (SPEC-CRED-0003); on refresh the data is read again from the authentic source (ADR-0023/AR3); revocation conditions in the policy (FW-POL-0001). Turning a change at the source into a revocation depends on the institution's process.Partly
TR22An attacker can circumvent the verification by the (Q)EAA provider that the wallet is in control of the user and have a (Q)EAA issued into a compromised wallet under the attacker's control.R3Issuer, Wallet providerThe issuer checks the WIA and key attestation before issuance (RB-AP-10, SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR19); device attestation is optional at W2.Partly
TR23An attacker can forge electronic attestations of attributes.R3VerifierES256 signatures only (SPEC-CRED-0002/C1), the chain ends at a root in the trusted list, the institution must be acceptable at iat and the type authorisation cannot be skipped (SPEC-API-0001/AP8).Met
TR24An attacker can inject forged electronic attestations of attributes into a wallet.R3Wallet providerThe Tamga wallet core checks the signature, the institution's listing and the type digest on receipt (RB-GEN-02); a forged credential is still rejected by the verifier. Other wallets' receipt checks are their provider's job.Partly
TR25The wallet can present attributes to a relying party without the approval of a user.R6Wallet providerEvery presentation needs user verification and field-by-field consent (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11, RB-WP-03, RB-H-02); on-device verification is ongoing.Partly
TR26PID, (Q)EAAs or pseudonyms can be presented to a wrong relying party.R6Verifier, Wallet providerThe client identifier comes from the access certificate (ADR-0034/CI1, CI2); a request without a registration certificate is rejected (ADR-0056/MR5); the KB-JWT aud is the full client identifier (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV7); a pseudonym per site (ADR-0031/PS1).Met
TR27An attacker can initiate a malicious renewal of EAA.R6IssuerThe refresh token is bound to the client-instance key of the first issuance (ADR-0060/RT1), DPoP is mandatory (RT2), single use (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR18); silent refresh only under defined conditions (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL7).Met
TR28An attacker can get a user into wrongfully approving a request for electronic attestations of attributes (phishing or other).R6Wallet providerField-by-field consent, a separate warning for over-asking (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL8, RB-WP-04), the verifier's registered name (RB-WP-13), the disclosure-policy warning (ADR-0046/EP3). Phishing cannot be ruled out entirely.Partly
TR29An attacker can leak attributes from the wallet and identify the wallet user where identification is not required/allowed.R6Wallet provider, VerifierSelective disclosure, age fields (ADR-0064/YE2), a pseudonym per site (RB-RP-13), zero-knowledge proofs (ADR-0032), scope check (SPEC-API-0001/AP6). Residual risk FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L3.Partly
TR30An attacker can defeat technical and procedural controls to extract data.R6Operator, Wallet providerNo personal data in shared records (RB-GEN-01, SPEC-TRUST-0001/TL11); no values in logs (RB-GEN-06); wallet data stays on the device. No independent penetration test.Partly
TR31A request can be leaked to an attacker.R6VerifierThe request is signed; each fetch of request_uri is a separate branch with a fresh state, nonce and encryption key (ADR-0067/RQ1); the response is encrypted (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3). The requested field names are visible to anyone who fetches the request object.Partly
TR32An attacker can obtain knowledge on the embedded disclosure policy for attributes and present attributes contained in the current request by wallet units.R6Issuer, Wallet providerThe policy is public in signed metadata (by design; ADR-0046/EP1); the policy does not remove the person's consent, the wallet presents only with the person's approval (EP3, SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11).Partly
TR33An attacker can extract logs, or parts of them.R6Wallet providerThe log stays on the device; it leaves only in an export the person starts, encrypted with a password (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL4, ADR-0027/LX1, LX2). Device-level protection rests on the platform.Partly
TR34An attacker can know whether a wallet is installed on the same device he is using, or on another one, and get information on it.R6Wallet providerThe WIA sub is shared by all instances of the same wallet solution (ADR-0034/CI6); no endpoint reveals the wallet. App detection at operating-system level is the platform's domain.Partly
TR35An attacker can obtain a knowledge factor used for user authenticating to the WSCA.R6Wallet providerUser verification is by the device's biometrics or passcode (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); the attempt limit is in the platform; no certified WSCA.Partly
TR36The electronic attestation of attributes about a person that is presented in multiple transactions with a relying party, or across different relying parties, unintentionally allows to link multiple transactions to the relevant person.R6Wallet provider, IssuerTen copies issued in a batch (RB-AP-09), a separate copy per verifier (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL5, RB-WP-05), a pseudonym per site (ADR-0031/PS1), zero-knowledge proofs for the identity credential (ADR-0032). The same copy for the same verifier is by design; residual risk FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L3.Partly
TR37A public attestation/relying party revocation list can contain information about the user's usage of their attestation (e.g. location, IP address ...).R6Issuer, OperatorStatus lists are published at a fixed interval (SPEC-CRED-0003/S5), verifiers prefetch in bulk (S12), positions are random (S7); IP addresses are not logged (RB-GEN-05).Met
TR38Not being able to prove user's consent for shared attributes, relying parties can affect the integrity of logs.R6Verifier, Wallet providerThe presentation is bound to the person's key by the KB-JWT or the device signature; the verifier's audit record is kept for rejections too (SPEC-API-0001/AP9). The wallet log has no integrity protection.Partly
TR39An attacker can unlawfully trace wallet users using unique/traceable identifiers.R6 / R14Wallet provider, VerifierNo global identifier (SPEC-ID-0002/XC4, RB-H-06); a pseudonym per site (ADR-0031/PS1); sign-in policies do not ask for the national number (PS4); the WIA sub is shared (ADR-0034/CI6). If the national number is disclosed the person can be traced.Partly
TR40A relying party that consists of multiple units/entities that each have a different scope of what they are allowed to request/process, can request and process data for which they do not have lawful grounds for.R6 / R9Verifier, OperatorRegistration with a scope (RB-REG-08), one registration certificate per intended use (RB-RP-14), scope check (SPEC-API-0001/AP6), intermediary relation in both records (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV14). One access certificate per verifier; the EU split into relying party instances is not there.Partly
TR41An attacker can subvert the integrity and authenticity checks by the wallet of PIDs to always return success.R7Wallet provider, VerifierThe acceptance decision is not in the wallet but in the verifier's own pipeline (RB-RP-03); subverting the wallet's check does not get a forged credential accepted.Met
TR42An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify the integrity and authenticity of requested attributes to always return success.R7Wallet provider, VerifierThe verifier checks the signature, digests and sd_hash itself (RB-RP-03, SPEC-CRED-0002/C9, C10).Met
TR43An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify all requested attributes belonging to the same user to always return success.R7Wallet provider, VerifierThe verifier checks the holder binding of each credential in the same response separately against the same aud and nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV7, PV10, PV11); there is no cryptographic link showing that the credentials belong to the same wallet unit (see TR86).Partly
TR44An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify the PID is valid and issued by a trusted PID provider to always return success.R7Wallet provider, VerifierThe verifier itself asks the signed list whether the institution was acceptable at iat and authorised for the type (RB-RP-03, SPEC-API-0001/AP8).Met
TR45An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify that a QEAA is valid and issued by a qualified TSP, who is registered to issue the QEAA, to always return success.R7VerifierThere is no qualified trust service provider in the network; the qualified class is not recorded without an independent conformity assessment (ADR-0022/IDC1).Not applicable
TR46An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify whether the PID has been revoked by the PID provider to always return success.R7Wallet provider, VerifierThe verifier checks the status itself (SPEC-CRED-0003); a credential of a status-list type without a status entry is rejected (ADR-0056/MR8).Met
TR47An attacker can bypass or subvert the performance of checks by the wallet that verify whether the (Q)EAA has been revoked by the (Q)EAA provider to always return success.R7Wallet provider, VerifierSame as TR46: the verifier checks revocation itself (SPEC-CRED-0003, ADR-0056/MR8).Met
TR48An attacker can modify the content of backup and recovery data that should be exclusively under the user's control.R7 / R8Wallet providerThere is no wallet backup (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL2, RB-WP-07); the migration file is password-encrypted and holds no credential values or keys (ADR-0027/LX2, ADR-0078).Not applicable
TR49An attacker can modify the transaction history for a given wallet instance from the activity logs.R7 / R8Wallet providerThe log is kept on the device; it has no integrity protection such as a signature or a hash chain.Open
TR50An attacker can eavesdrop during the connection from the wallet to relying parties.R5 / R6Verifier, Wallet providerTLS and encrypted response (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3, RB-RP-02); session encryption in proximity.Met
TR51An attacker can convince a user to share personal data (i.e. PID, EAA-s, pseudonyms, electronic signatures, logs and other data) with the attacker or with a third party that the user did not intend to do so.R5 / R6Wallet providerMandatory registration certificate (RB-WP-19), the registered name (RB-WP-13), field-by-field consent and the over-asking warning (RB-WP-04); no presentation to a suspended or unregistered verifier. Persuasion cannot be ruled out entirely.Partly
TR52An attacker can read the transaction history for a given wallet instance from the activity logs.R5 / R6Wallet providerThe log stays on the device and never goes to a server (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL4, SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV8); export is encrypted (ADR-0027/LX1).Partly
TR53An attacker can export or extract cryptographic key material outside of the WSCD.R5 / R6 / R9Wallet providerKeys are generated in the secure area and never leave it (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1, RB-WP-01); the key attestation states the storage level truthfully (ADR-0025/WIA3). No certified WSCD (W3).Partly
TR54An attacker can read the content of backup and recovery data that should be exclusively under the user's control.R5 / R6Wallet providerThere is no wallet backup (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL2); the migration file is password-encrypted (ADR-0027/LX1).Not applicable
TR55An attacker can bypass the user authentication method to use a pseudonym generated by a wallet unit.R4Wallet providerA pseudonym presentation is signed with the pseudonym key and carries a non-revoked unit attestation (ADR-0031/PS5); user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11).Partly
TR56An attacker can propose an application that mimics a specific legitimate wallet to users.R4Wallet provider, IssuerThe issuer accepts only a WIA signed by a listed provider (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR11); the "Listed on Tamga Network" indicator comes from the signed list (ADR-0049/LI1–LI3). A person installing a lookalike app cannot be prevented.Partly
TR57An attacker can export wallet data, including PID, (Q)EAAs or logs.R4Wallet providerExport only when the person starts it, password-encrypted; the file holds no credential values, copies or keys (ADR-0027/LX1, LX2).Partly
TR58An attacker can export cryptographic binding material.R4Wallet providerKeys never leave the secure area (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1); no certified WSCD.Partly
TR59An attacker can take over identities through the cryptographic keys of the wallet.R4Wallet providerKey use is bound to user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1, WL11); when the unit is revoked its WIA entries are revoked (ADR-0025/WIA2).Partly
TR60An attacker can duplicate another user's personal wallet unit on their personal device and use it.R4 / R1Wallet providerKeys are bound to the device and cannot be moved (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1, WL2); device attestation is mandatory at W3 and optional at W2 (RB-WP-17).Partly
TR61Authorities of another state can ask the user to show and/or share all the wallet data in a situation of proximity, such as when crossing the border of that state.R4 / R14Wallet providerField-by-field consent for every presentation (RB-H-02) and selective disclosure; reader registration and gate groups in proximity (ADR-0069). Technical measures against legal compulsion are limited.Partly
TR62Users cannot transfer their transaction logs after failure of a user device, resulting in a loss of traceability of previous transactions on the new wallet.R11Wallet providerThe log moves with the person's encrypted migration file while the device works (ADR-0078, ADR-0027/LX1); there is no transfer path from a failed device.Partly
TR63Users cannot recover their transaction logs after failure of a user device, resulting in a loss of traceability on the new wallet.R11Wallet providerThere is deliberately no server-side backup (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL2, WL4); the log is lost on failure.Open
TR64Relying parties can have difficulties proving consent for remote electronic signatures.R11VerifierThe network has no electronic-signature function today.Not applicable
TR65An attacker can flood the connection(s) with requests during the connection to relying parties.R13VerifierRequest limits in the reference verifier; memory limits on request_uri branches (ADR-0067/RQ5). No load testing yet.Partly
TR66An attacker can flood a status provisioning service with connections to relying parties.R13Issuer, OperatorStatus lists are published as static files through a content delivery network; verifiers do not fetch per verification but prefetch in bulk (SPEC-CRED-0003/S12). No load testing yet.Partly
TR67An attacker can make the attribute presentation appearing as contested/denied, despite the attribute presentation stating its validity.R13VerifierThe result is three-valued; "indeterminate" is not treated as rejected (SPEC-API-0001/AP2, RB-RP-05) and is shown separately to the person (SPEC-CRED-0003/S14); the result lists the steps performed and skipped.Partly
TR68An attacker can revoke a PID without justified reason.R13Identity serviceRevocation conditions are in the policy (FW-POL-0001); only the issuer revokes; the person can object (RB-H-05). Protecting the status key is the issuer's job.Partly
TR69An attacker can revoke a PID without user consent.R13Identity serviceSame as TR68; the paths for revocation at the person's request are in the policy (FW-POL-0001).Partly
TR70An attacker can revoke a (Q)EAA without justified reason.R13IssuerRevocation conditions are in the common policy; an institution can only add conditions, not narrow them (ADR-0047/WR2); the status key is separate from the signing key (SPEC-CRED-0003/S11).Partly
TR71An attacker can revoke a (Q)EAA without user consent.R13IssuerSame as TR70 (FW-POL-0001).Partly
TR72An attacker can trigger multiple identification requests without them being recognised as intentional orphan requests.R13Verifier, Wallet providerThe request object has a lifetime (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV13), nonce is single use (PV10), branches are memory-bounded (ADR-0067/RQ5); the wallet rejects a request without a registration certificate without asking the person (RB-WP-19).Partly
TR73An attacker can send multiple requests with no follow-up transaction.R13VerifierSame as TR72; request limits in the reference verifier.Partly
TR74An attacker can allow a relying party to request identification without a matching identification (response) and full control.R13VerifierEvery request is signed and bound to a registered verifier (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV6, RB-RP-01); a response closes only its own branch (ADR-0067/RQ2).Partly
TR75An attacker can send a response to a request after its timeout, or similar situations leading to a service disruption.R13VerifierThe request object has a lifetime (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV13), nonce is single use (PV10); a response that cannot be decrypted does not touch the presentation and does not count as an attempt (ADR-0067/RQ4).Met
TR76A relying party can send multiple invalid requests.R13Verifier, Wallet providerThe wallet rejects an unsigned request or one without a registration certificate without asking the person (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV6, RB-WP-19); the enforcement ladder for an abusing verifier (RB-ENF-02).Partly
TR77An attacker can send multiple invalid requests to a wallet provider.R13Wallet providerNo network rule; the provider's operational measure. Unit requests are signed with the unit key (ADR-0025).Partly
TR78An attacker can make a Member State unable to revoke an untrusted PID provider from the trusted PID provider trusted list.R13OperatorThe list is re-signed at least every 90 days and changes are published quickly (RB-OP-03); a stale list yields "indeterminate" (RB-GEN-03). The list signature rests with a single operator (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L1).Partly
TR79An attacker can prevent suspension or revocation of a wallet.R13Wallet provider, Identity serviceUnit revocation without the phone and without an account (ADR-0047/WR3); a WIA lives less than 24 hours (ADR-0025/WIA1); the identity service revokes its credentials on a revoked unit within 24 hours (ADR-0047/WR1).Met
TR80An attacker can block transactions by relying parties, users and/or PID provider.R13Operator, VerifierOffline presentation in proximity; verifiers prefetch lists (RB-RP-06); "indeterminate" on a stale source (RB-GEN-03). No outage testing yet.Partly
TR81An attacker can disable or make a WSCD unavailable.R13Wallet providerThe platform's secure area; after device loss or failure the credentials are issued again (RB-H-04).Partly
TR82An attacker can make the PID provider unable to revoke or suspend PIDs.R13 / R9Identity serviceThe status list is published at a fixed interval even without changes; on restart without a published token it is published at once (SPEC-CRED-0003/S5, S6); when the token expires the verifier returns "indeterminate".Partly
TR83A relying party can derive the user's identity data beyond data shared with them.R14VerifierScope check (SPEC-API-0001/AP6), data-minimisation review (RB-REG-08), selective disclosure and age fields (ADR-0064/YE2).Partly
TR84A group of colluding relying parties or PID providers can derive the user's identity data beyond data known to them.R14Verifier, IssuerA separate copy and pseudonym per verifier; zero-knowledge proofs for the identity credential (ADR-0032). Linkage remains possible if credentials of the same issuer are combined (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L3).Partly
TR85An attacker can track and trace a user by using person identification data of the user where identification of the user is not required.R14VerifierSign-in policies do not ask for the national number (ADR-0031/PS4); a pseudonym per site (RB-RP-13); scope check (SPEC-API-0001/AP6).Partly
TR86An attacker can combine a 'forged' presentation of (Q)EAA combinations.R10VerifierThe holder binding of each credential in the same response is checked separately against the same aud and nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV7, PV10, PV11); if two people's wallets cooperate, there is no cryptographic link showing that the credentials belong to the same wallet unit. The EU discussion is ongoing.Partly
TR87An attacker can activate/take over the wallet remotely (e.g., a bank app embedding an authentication or attestation request) without the explicit consent or sole control of the user, in situations where the user is unaware of (e.g., asleep), or cannot see the relying party.R10Wallet providerEvery presentation needs user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); the consent screen shows the verifier's registered name (RB-WP-13).Partly
TR88Attackers can make changes to a request's metadata (service name, usages, etc.).R10Verifier, Wallet providerThe request object is signed (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV6); the registration certificate is signed and bound to the access certificate (ADR-0026/WRC4).Met
TR89Attackers can make changes to response information (service state, nonce, etc.).R10VerifierThe response is encrypted (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3); the KB-JWT signs nonce and aud (PV7), sd_hash binds the presented set (SPEC-CRED-0002/C9).Met
TR90Attackers can make changes to a request's attribute information (over asking, etc.).R10Verifier, Wallet providerThe request is signed; the wallet compares what is asked with the registered scope and warns on over-asking (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL8); scope check at the verifier (SPEC-API-0001/AP6).Met
TR91A relying party can replay elements from a previous session in another session.R10Verifiernonce is single use (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV10); every fetch is a fresh branch (PV15); KB-JWT iat window (SPEC-CRED-0002/C17).Met
TR92An attacker can replace or modify the PID during its transfer from the PID provider to the wallet unit.R10Identity service, Wallet providerThe credential is signed and travels over TLS; the access token is DPoP-bound (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR17); on receipt the wallet checks the signature and the binding to its own key.Met
TR93An attacker can replace or modify the PID during its transfer from the wallet unit to the online relying party.R10VerifierCredential signature, KB-JWT and encrypted response (SPEC-CRED-0002/C8, SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3).Met
TR94An attacker can replace or modify the PID during its transfer from the wallet unit to the offline relying party.R10VerifierIn mdoc the issuer's signature and a session-bound device signature (ADR-0013/MD3, SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV11); session encryption in proximity.Met
TR95An attacker can issue a PID without the user's consent.R9Identity serviceInformation and explicit consent before the identity credential (SPEC-ID-0003/IDP11); the person's final confirmation in the wallet that started the flow (ADR-0080/VL1); the "your credential was added to a wallet" notice (RB-AP-15).Met
TR96An attacker can use revoked or invalid embedded disclosure policies, possibly without the relying parties' knowledge.R9Issuer, Wallet providerThe policy lives only in signed metadata (ADR-0046/EP1); credentials of a configuration whose policy changes are revoked (EP4); the wallet evaluates the policy offline (EP2).Met
TR97An attacker can trick the wallet into verifying wrong electronic signatures.R9Wallet providerThe network has no electronic-signature function today.Not applicable
TR98An attacker can use the wallet outside of the user's control.R9Wallet providerUser verification for every presentation (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); unit revocation without the phone (ADR-0047/WR3).Partly
TR99An attacker can convince a user to authenticate and approve transactions with an attacker or unauthorised third party.R9Wallet providerMandatory registration certificate (RB-WP-19), the registered name (RB-WP-13); no presentation to a suspended or revoked verifier. Persuasion cannot be ruled out entirely.Partly
TR100An attacker can make a user electronically sign without presenting the content to the user or after presenting wrong content.R9Wallet providerThe network has no electronic-signature function today.Not applicable
TR101An attacker can bypass access control of the user's account with the wallet provider.R9Wallet providerThe wallet provider requires no user account (ADR-0047/WR3); the unit record holds no personal data (ADR-0025/WIA2).Not applicable
TR102An attacker can impersonate relying parties during the connection to relying parties.R9 / R6Verifier, Wallet providerThe client identifier comes from the access certificate and must match the leaf (ADR-0034/CI1, CI2); mandatory registration certificate (ADR-0056/MR5); signed request (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV6).Met
TR103The user behind the relying party – browser connection can be different from the user behind the relying party – wallet connection.R9 / R6 / R4VerifierOn the Digital Credentials API path the response is bound to the page origin (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV7); on the cross-device (QR) path there is no separate link between the browser session and the wallet.Partly
TR104An attacker can convince the user to revoke the user's wallet without reason.R9 / R13Wallet providerRevocation is done with the person's closing code or from inside the wallet (ADR-0047/WR3); the person can learn of a revocation outside the wallet (WR4). Persuasion cannot be ruled out entirely.Partly
TR105An attacker can perform man-in-the-middle attacks.R9 / R6 / R14Verifier, Wallet providerTLS, signed request, encrypted response (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV3, PV6); session encryption in proximity; the access certificate is bound to the client identifier (ADR-0034/CI2).Met
TR106An attacker can present invalid or revoked attributes from a wallet that does not regularly connect to the network.variousVerifierThe verifier checks status and validity itself (SPEC-CRED-0003); zero-knowledge presentation only with copies valid for at most 24 hours (ADR-0044/ZC1).Met
TR107An attacker can steal information from a user by spoofing a wallet.variousWallet providerThe issuer accepts only a listed provider's WIA (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR11); the "listed" indicator (ADR-0049/LI1–LI3). A person entering data into a fake app cannot be prevented.Partly
TR108An attacker can impersonate the user by replaying/imitating a data request (e.g., authentication), which would appear as valid.variousVerifierSingle-use nonce (SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV10), KB-JWT aud and iat window (PV7, SPEC-CRED-0002/C17).Met
TR109An attacker can replay an embedded disclosure policy towards a user, to imitate an approved request.variousWallet providerThe policy is stored with the credential from signed metadata (ADR-0046/EP2); the policy never replaces the person's consent, every presentation needs approval (EP3).Partly
TR110An attacker can exploit the lack of information of wallet users, or undue delays, after a security breach or compromise.variousOperator, Wallet providerIncident notification deadlines (RB-GEN-09), a way for the person to learn of a unit revocation outside the wallet (ADR-0047/WR4), a quarterly transparency report (RB-OP-12). The only direct warning channel to the person is the wallet's own notifications.Partly
TR111An attacker can modify a previously installed legitimate wallet instance to add malicious features.variousWallet providerDevice attestation mandatory at W3 (RB-WP-17); per-version revocation of wallet attestations when a flaw is found (RB-WP-11).Partly
TR112An attacker can modify a legitimate wallet instance and propose it to users as a legitimate one.variousWallet providerSame as TR111; the issuer accepts only a listed provider's WIA (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR11).Partly
TR113An attacker can defeat the user authentication mechanism itself to bypass the authentication of the wallet user.variousWallet providerUser verification uses the platform's biometrics or passcode (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); no certification.Partly
TR114An attacker can introduce malicious code or backdoors into the wallet code during its deployment to the user device.variousWallet providerApp store signing; release provenance for packages (RB-GEN-07).Partly
TR115An attacker can introduce malicious code or backdoors into the wallet code during its development.variousWallet providerOpen-source core, release provenance (RB-GEN-07), mandatory pre-release tests (RB-ENF-01); no independent code audit.Partly
TR116An attacker can tamper with the generation of random numbers to reduce their entropy sufficiently to enable attacks.variousWallet provider, IssuerThe platform's cryptographic generator; salt ≥ 128 bits (SPEC-CRED-0002/C3); random status position (SPEC-CRED-0003/S7).Partly
TR117An attacker can tamper with user devices in the supply chain to include code or configurations that do not meet the conditions of use of the wallet.variousWallet providerDevice attestation mandatory at W3, optional at W2 (RB-WP-17).Partly
TR118An attacker can activate a wallet unit while using a spoofed WSCD controlled by the attackers.variousWallet providerThe key attestation states the storage level truthfully (ADR-0025/WIA3); a W3 claim only for a unit with verified device attestation (ADR-0047/WR5).Partly
TR119An attacker can read information sent to the WSCA and/or the WSCD.variousWallet providerThe WSCA and WSCD are the platform's secure area; there is no separate certified component (FW-ARF-0001 §7.1).Partly
TR120An attacker can send arbitrary information to the WSCA.variousWallet providerSame as TR119.Partly
TR121An attacker can steal information by intercepting the exchanges between the WSCA and the WSCD.variousWallet providerSame as TR119.Partly
TR122An attacker can send arbitrary information to the WSCD.variousWallet providerSame as TR119.Partly
TR123An attacker can send information to the WSCD, circumnavigating the WSCA.variousWallet providerSame as TR119.Partly
TR124An attacker can use phishing to get users to a fake wallet and PID management web application.variousIdentity service, Wallet providerIdentity proofing only in a flow the wallet starts, with the final confirmation in that wallet (ADR-0080/VL1, VL2); a warning before proofing (VL3). Entering data into a fake page cannot be prevented.Partly
TR125An attacker can replace a wallet's keys with other keys to create messages to be used in another attack.variousWallet provider, IssuerBefore issuance the key attestation shows the keys are in secure hardware (RB-AP-10); each copy is bound to the attested key (SPEC-PROTO-0001/PR6).Partly
TR126An attacker can modify or destroy a wallet's keys, making some functions of the wallet unusable.variousWallet providerCredentials are issued again (RB-H-04); key deletion follows a fixed order (record first, then key).Partly
TR127An attacker can control a malware to access data stored in the wallet.variousWallet providerKeys in the secure area (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1); data in the platform's app sandbox; device attestation.Partly
TR128An attacker can access evidence generated in the wallet.variousWallet providerThe log stays on the device and leaves only in an encrypted export (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL4).Partly
TR129Wallet providers can access objects in the wallet.variousWallet providerThe provider never sees credential values; the unit record holds no personal data (ADR-0025/WIA2); the provider holds no recovery key (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL10) and takes no backup (WL2).Met
TR130Wallet providers can access evidence generated in the wallet.variousWallet providerThe presentation log never goes to a server (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL4, SPEC-PROTO-0002/PV8).Met
TR131An attacker can steal an unlocked wallet device.variousWallet providerUser verification again for every presentation (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL11); unit revocation without the phone (ADR-0047/WR3).Partly
TR132An attacker can manipulate the system to prevent certain events from being logged.variousWallet providerLogging is done in the wallet core; there is no integrity protection showing that the log is complete.Open
TR133An attacker can intercept communication between the wallet instance and the WSCA, or replay/imitate a user (e.g. by hijacking authentication mechanism).variousWallet providerKey use is bound to the platform's user verification (SPEC-WALLET-0001/WL1, WL11); no separate certified WSCA.Partly

7. Open topics ​

  1. Same person in a multi-credential presentation (TR20, TR43, TR86): the verifier checks the holder binding of each credential in the same response separately; there is no cryptographic link showing that the credentials belong to the same wallet unit. The topic is under discussion in the EU as well.
  2. Integrity of the wallet log (TR38, TR49, TR132): the log stays on the device but is not protected against modification or omission.
  3. Certification and independent audit: there is no certified secure hardware (W3), no independent code audit and no penetration test; that is why most wallet-side measures are "Partly".
  4. Single operator (TR4, TR17, TR78): the list signature rests with a single operator; the key ceremony and hardware security module are pending (FW-ARF-0001 §7.4 L1).

Status ​

Active — version 1.0.0 (16 November 2026). A self-assessment; updated in the same piece of work whenever a risk or a measure changes.

Tamga ARF 1.0 · CC BY 4.0 · The Turkish text is the source; this is its official translation